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Summary 
This research is a critical analysis of a delay regime for multimodal 
transport, or door-to-door transport. At this day, there are no mandatory 
rules governing multimodal transport, but a process of creating a set of rules 
are pending both within UNCITRAL as well as the European Union. Due to 
the increased use of containers in shipping, multimodal transport has 
become more common. For this purpose, shipping companies are commonly 
signing contracts in which they agree on being responsible for loss or 
damage throughout the whole journey, until the goods are discharged at 
final destination. However, problems will most likely arise in case of a 
dispute. Since a multimodal regime does not exist, the rules applicable to 
such contractual relationship are not one, but various transport conventions. 
The present system creates unpredictability for the contracting parties as to 
what rules are applicable on their contractual relationship, which leads to 
significant amounts spent on legal counselling. Thus, there is a need for a 
set of mandatory rules within the field of multimodal transport.  
 
The increased multimodal transport, in combination with an increased just-
in-time management has increased the importance of a timely delivery and a 
functioning transport chain. The research will focus on the issues arising out 
of delay in delivery under the future multimodal regime. Since the 
UNCITRAL draft is not yet in force, the conclusion will have a de lege 
ferenda perspective. In order to reach a conclusion, delay regimes in the 
various unimodal laws existing will be reviewed, as well as obsolete and 
non-mandatory multimodal rules existing.      
 
Liability for carrier delay in delivery is imposed in one way or another in 
every field of transport. Liability could be imposed either only by agreement 
between the parties or also an imposed delay by statute for what could be 
expected from a “reasonable carrier”. In my conclusion, I will analyze how 
a delay provision ought to be stipulated in a multimodal regime in order to 
gain a feasible set of rules. A feasible set of rules is one that has enough 
signing states to unify the existing laws existing today and makes 
contractual relationships more predictable with regards to possible effects of 
breach of contract. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Presentation 
The nature of transporting goods is changing. Enterprises world wide are 
entering the just-in-time generation, which means shipments are smaller, but 
more frequent. As an effect, the corporation is less dependent on large 
storage warehouses. Instead, production is initiated by demand among the 
customers. This way has shown to decrease costs in an organization by less 
over-produced items going to waste and less cost for storage. This so called 
“production on demand” increases the importance of a functioning chain of 
transport. Hence, an occurred delay in delivery is having worse 
consequences, since the production is dependent upon a timely delivery.1
 
The nature of transport is changing also in other perspectives. The door-to-
door transport is today a common concept by the increased use of 
containerized transport.2 The handling of containers is simplifying the 
transport concept as a whole and has lead to an increased multimodal 
transport, i.e. where two or more modes of transport are used for the 
purpose of forwarding goods. Within multimodal shipping, the transport 
industry is commonly using shipping contracts in which a multimodal 
transport operator (MTO) accepts liability towards the other contracting 
party throughout the whole journey until the cargo is discharged at the 
business place of the consignee. Such contract is an attractive choice to the 
cargo owner, as he gets only one counterpart in case of a possible dispute. 
 
There is no international binding instrument at this day that governs 
international multimodal transport. The problem with absence of such 
regime is that various mandatory unimodal laws (i.e. one mode of carriage) 
are applicable on each and every part of the voyage during the transport. In 
other words, even though the MTO has accepted liability towards the cargo 
owner, different rules are applicable on their contractual relationship 
dependent on where the loss or damage arose. If the occurred loss or delay 
was caused at sea, maritime law is applicable and if the occurred loss or 
delay was caused on the road part of the transport, applicable road carriage 
law is governing. Even though multimodal contracts make door-to-door 
transport easier, there are a number of issues arising through the absence of 
an international instrument on multimodal carriage. 
                                                 
1 M. Ganado, H. Kindred, The law of delay in the carriage of general cargoes by sea 
(London, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd. 1990, 1st ed) at 3. 
2 The container throughput has grown from 0 in 1965 to 225.3 million moves in 2000. It is 
forecasted that in 2010, there will be 500 million moves. The rate of manufactured goods 
transported by sea was estimated to 75 % in 2000 and a majority of these transports are 
containerized. See UNCTAD, “Multimodal transport: the feasibility of an international 
legal instrument”, 13 January 2003, online: 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20031_en.pdf> at 4. 
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CMI has initiated a work to draft a convention for multimodal transport. An 
UNCTAD-report3 summarizes questionnaires sent to interests worldwide in 
the industry. The report states that there is a vast majority of the involved 
parties in transport, i.e. governments, carriers, shipping companies and 
NGO’s that is of the opinion that the market is in need of a new legal 
instrument to cover door-to-door transport. The work has resulted in a draft 
of an international multimodal convention. The most recent draft is 
published by UNCITRAL in April 2007 (hereinafter: the UNCITRAL 
draft).4 An attempt to create a legal instrument has been made before, by 
drafting the Multimodal Transport Convention from 1980.5 The attempt was 
not successful as it did not reach enough ratifications to enter into force. 
 
The main objective with the UNCITRAL draft is to clarify and unify the law 
of transport in the world. In order to fulfil the main objective, the draft 
needs a clear support by the major shipping nations in the world. USA is of 
the standpoint that delay is a matter of commerce and shall be dealt with by 
the contracting parties themselves in the contract of carriage. The opposite 
point of view is that smaller businesses need a protection in the law from the 
increasing importance of a timely delivery. According to the commentators 
of this view, small businesses have no leverage to change the conditions in 
contracts of carriage. Hence, the parties within UNCITRAL are far from 
consensus on the matter. 
 
The delay provision might be the crucial issue with regards to the feasibility 
of the whole convention. Will not the drafting of a multimodal instrument 
for transport law without one of the greatest shipping nations have the 
opposite effect rather than unifying the applicable rules? Is the drafting of 
the UNCITRAL draft even worth while if there isn’t a significant support by 
the major shipping nations? The result might be to add one more source of 
law instead of unifying the existing ones.6
1.2 Outline 
As stated above, the delay provision in the UNCITRAL draft might be one 
of the crucial provisions that need to be compromised in order to fulfil the 
main objective of the convention. Therefore, this paper will analyze a 
proper enactment of a delay provision in the new generation of shipping, i.e. 
the door-to-door generation. The analysis will contemplate whether delay 
ought to be part of multimodal transport law at all and if so, to what extent 
delay liability should be imposed. Either only after agreement between the 
                                                 
3 UNCTAD, “Multimodal transport: the feasibility of an international legal instrument”, 13 
January 2003, online: <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20031_en.pdf>. 
4 UNCITRAL, Working Group III, Draft convention on the carriage of goods [wholly][or 
partly] by sea, New York 16-27 April 2007, arts. 17.1 and 21. 
5 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, Geneva 24 
May 1980, (The 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention). 
6 Michael F. Sturley, “Liability for delay under UNCITRAL’s Proposed Transport Law 
Convention”, 2006, 4 Benedict’s Maritime Bulletin 108 at 110.  
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contracting parties or also imposed liability for late delivery from what 
could be expected from a reasonable carrier.    
 
The analysis with regards to the delay regulation in the UNCITRAL-draft 
will be foregone by more general issues. These are questions that are 
fundamental to review in order to reach a conclusion in my essay. Firstly, I 
will discuss whether the scope of multimodal regime ought to be all kinds of 
multimodal transport, or as it is today, only apply when there is a sea leg 
involved.7 Secondly, I will review whether the convention should be 
mandatory or if the contracting parties should have the discretion to retain 
the option to choose another set of applicable rules. This is crucial, because 
some commentators are of the opinion that a multimodal regime is not 
required in some fields of transport. Moreover, previous multimodal 
regimes have chosen different liability systems. Either a liability system 
where the multimodal regime is applicable as a set of fall back rules in case 
it can’t be proven on what stage of the voyage the damage or delay arose. 
The other alternative is to incorporate a liability system where the set of 
rules apply at all stages, regardless if the location of the damage or delay is 
proven. Lastly, I will discuss further issues on delay, such as what limitation 
that should be applicable.     
 
As there is a lack of an internationally binding instruments, I will use delay 
provisions in unimodal law as guiding examples towards my conclusion on 
a delay provision in the UNCITRAL-draft. The delay regime in maritime 
law will be more thoroughly emphasized. This is mostly due to the draft’s 
application as a “maritime plus” convention. Delay provisions in other 
fields of transport will also be reviewed as a comparison to maritime law.  
 
Delay enactments in existing multimodal regimes will also be analyzed 
towards a conclusion as to how the best delay provision in a multimodal 
convention is drafted. Both commercial alternatives used in the practise of 
trade and governing mandatory law will be reviewed. The existing 
multimodal regimes are few and if existing, only covering national or 
regional transport, not global trade with a large number of signing states. 
Nevertheless, the rules are interesting to review as they are shown to work 
in multimodal trade practise. Three national states that have incorporated 
multimodal rules will be compared in chapter 4.4 below. The states 
(Germany, China and India) are chosen to compare the possible ways of 
enacting a delay regime, as they all have enacted different delay provisions.  
1.3 Delimitations 
The scope of this essay will cover carrier liability only. As a result, a 
situation where the shipper fails to provide goods as timely agreed is not 
covered by my research. The problems of establishing the carrier will 
neither be covered, i.e. whether it is the contracting or the actual carrier who 
is liable for an occurred delay. 
                                                 
7 Supra note 4, art. 5.  
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Delay can be just one of the competing interests in cargo claims and in 
many cases, it could be difficult to establish to what extent damages result 
from the delay vis-á-vis the other cause of loss, for instance a physical 
damage. If a delay causes cargo of bananas to rotten, the delay is the 
secondary cause of loss to the primary physical damage. When goods are 
physically damaged, the applicable convention articles on physical damage 
will prevail. It is only when the delay itself causes pure economic loss that 
the specific rules on delay will operate. This paper will cover issues where 
delay is the primary cause of loss and results in pure economic loss for the 
cargo claimant. 
1.4 Methodology 
The method used in the research process of this thesis is comparative, based 
on international legal material seen in a national context. The legal material 
is mainly international conventions and national legislation as incorporated. 
The national case law used in the thesis illustrates and gives support to the 
interpretation of the international legal instruments. 
1.5 Methodological problems 
Some case law in this research is older than the conventions themselves. 
This is not a mistake from my side. The outcomes of the cases are either 
applied today under new set of rules or are simply used as guiding examples 
of how the law has developed, even though the case reviewed has lost 
power as precedent. 
 
The law of delay has not much case law available in recent time. Since the 
establishment of new “statutorial” obligations of a timely delivery (see 
chapters 2.4, 3 and 4 below), one can hardly find any case law on the 
subject. The answer for this problem might lie in that the claims are not 
large enough to justify legal litigation. Claims for pure economic loss due to 
delay are probably most often resolved amicably among the parties by 
settlement or by arbitration. My research on delay in recent time is therefore 
limited to anticipations and what is written by other authors. 
1.6 Definitions 
Most of the words used for the purpose of this research are explained in 
detail in the text or as footnotes. However, there are a few notions that are 
commonly used in the text that are crucial to have defined. I use the term 
cargo owner for the person who is the contracting party, which is a bit 
misleading. It is not necessarily the cargo owner that contracts with the 
carrier. Synonym to cargo owner I will use the notion consignor, who is the 
actual contracting party to the shipping contract, whether he is the owner of 
the goods or not.  
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The notions used for performing party of the carriage are carrier and freight 
forwarder. In multimodal shipping, i.e. carriage with two or more modes of 
transport, Multimodal Transport Operator will be used synonym to carrier. 
Carrier will, however, also be used in unimodal shipping as well, i.e. only 
one mode of carriage. 
 
The party receiving the shipped goods is the consignee.  
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2 Delay in Maritime law 
2.1 Historical background 
An obligation by the carrier to take proper care of the goods and carrying 
the goods safely has been a priority in the field of shipping for a long time. 
However, it was in obsolete English law established that an obligation of 
carrying goods with a duty of timely performance did not exist. In the 
Parana8 from 1877, the court held that losses resulting from fall in market 
value could not be recovered in an ordinary way. At the time, sea carriage 
was considered to be unpredictable and courts could not find it justifiable to 
demand a duty of dispatch on the carrier.  
2.1.1 The new era  
With time, standard of ships got better, not least by the introduction of 
engine power, but also by improved navigational systems and more 
advanced cargo handling systems. The technological developments lead 
cargo claimants to start demanding responsibility also with regards to timely 
delivery by the carriers.9
  
The verdict in the Saxon star10 from the USA was one of the cases that first 
recognized the duty of timely performance in maritime law. The contracting 
parties to a charterparty11 had agreed upon a timely delivery of oil. The 
carrier’s engine broke down due to an insufficiently competent engine crew 
and had to be repaired which subsequently lead to delay of discharging the 
oil. The court held that the applicable rules (the USCOGSA) which allowed 
recovery for “loss or damage” not could be limited to physical damages 
only. The Saxon star recognized recovery for pure economic loss due to 
delay in shipping. 
 
The principle was confirmed also in English law, in the Heron II.12 The 
claimant in the case was awarded damages for loss arising from lost markets 
and a drop of price due to delay in delivery of a load of sugar. The carrier 
had deviated from the agreed voyage and arrived 9 days later than the 
agreed date in the contract. During this time, the price of sugar had dropped 
                                                 
 
8 The Parana (1877) 2 P.D (C.A). 
9 Ganado, supra note 1 at 2. 
10 Adamastos Shipping Co. Ltd. v. Anglo-Saxon Petroleum Co. Ltd. [1957] 1 Lloyd's. Rep. 
271 (re art. "loss or damage under art. 4(1) and (2)). 
11 “Contract to lease a ship”. The Hague rules (as incorporated in the USCOGSA 1936) 
were found to be applicable on the case due to a Paramount clause (a recognized clause 
within maritime law referring to a choice of applicable law to the contract). Normally 
charterparties are not subject to any mandatory transport law. See W. Tetley, Glossary of 
Maritime Law Terms (Montréal, International Shipping Publications, 2004, 2nd ed) at 24. 
12 C. Czarnikov Ltd. v. Koufos (The Heron II) (1969) 1 A.C. 350, (1967) Lloyd’s Rep. 457. 
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significantly. The court held the carrier liable for the occurred loss, since it 
ought to have been clear that any delay in delivery of the cargo would lead 
to the drop of market price. The cargo claimant had made this fact clear to 
the carrier when negotiating the terms of the contract.  
2.1.2 The foreseeability test 
The rule of recovery for occurred losses due to breach of contract is well 
established in the Canadian case Hadley v. Baxendale13. The ratio is today 
applicable on all fields of carriage. Hadley, the plaintiff in the case, operated 
a mill on which the crankshaft broke. The defendant, Baxendale was 
contracted to deliver the crankshaft to engineers for repair by a certain date. 
Baxendale failed to do so, which caused Hadley to lose business and suing 
Baxendale for damages. The court did not allow Hadley damages because 
the occurred damages could not be foreseeable to Baxendale. Baxendale 
could only be held liable if the loss was generally foreseeable or if Hadley 
specifically had mentioned the special circumstances under which he agreed 
to the contract. 
 
The court created a test to determine whether losses are possible to recover 
from. The test is applicable to the modern law on recovery from pure 
economic loss. In the judgement the court stipulated the following. “Where 
two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the 
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of 
contract should be as fairly and reasonably be considered either arising 
naturally, i.e. according to the usual course of things, from such breach of 
the contract itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in 
the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it”. 
 
Damages from breach of contract are those that arise naturally from the 
breach of contract. In other words, the test is based on what was foreseeable 
to the contracting parties. Thus, if the carrier knew or reasonably could be 
expected to know about the anticipated damages of the counterpart, he is 
liable for the occurred loss. The damages need to be in reasonable 
contemplation by the parties at the formation of the contract, but not 
necessarily explicit. However, if damages are claimed due to a special 
circumstance, notice needs to be given explicitly during the formation of the 
contract, i.e. if you for some reason need the goods delivered by Christmas, 
you must give notice to the other party of that circumstance at the formation 
of the contract. How to determine whether damages arose naturally out of 
the contract or if it ought to be claimed as special damages is a matter of 
opinion and is left to be determined by courts in the light of the facts of each 
case. No clear distinction is made beforehand.14
 
                                                 
13 Hadley v. Baxendale, (1854) 9 Ex. C.R. 341; E.R. 145. 
14 Ganado, supra note 1 at 116. 
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2.2 The overriding obligation of seaworthiness 
The possible defences available to the carrier in the applicable 
conventions15 to justify a delay are dependent upon an obligation by the 
carrier having been duly diligent in keeping the vessel seaworthy before and 
at the commencement of the voyage. This obligation has been defined as “a 
genuine, competent and reasonable effort”.16 The obligation will not be 
dealt with in detail in this research, but it is important to understand that any 
defence that the carrier may invoke to avoid liability for delay is dependent 
upon the overriding obligation of seaworthiness. Delay is often justified by 
some other cause, for instance the carrier needing to make repairs in a port 
of refuge. However, in order to even consider a delay being justified, one 
must first determine whether the carrier exercised his obligation of due 
diligence in keeping the vessel seaworthy before and at the commencement 
of the voyage. Once this is established, one can consider whether the delay 
itself was justified. If it is established that the vessel wasn’t seaworthy 
before or at the commencement of the voyage, no defences can be invoked 
and the carrier will be liable towards the claimant. Thus, if the carrier was 
delayed due to repairs of a vessel that was unseaworthy at the 
commencement of the voyage, the carrier is unable to justify the delay as 
being reasonable.17
2.3 The Hague and Hague-Visby rules 
The Hague18 and Hague-Visby19 rules are the most commonly ratified 
conventions in the field of carriage of goods by sea. There is no express 
provision in the rules making the carrier liable for delay in delivery. The 
only reference to liability is to “loss or damage” of goods. Thus, in order to 
establish whether losses due to delay can be recovered under the rules, one 
has to interpret the wording of “loss or damage”. Depending on how broadly 
interpreted the wording of the paragraph is, one can either assume that the 
loss or damage is with regards to the goods itself, but also a loss or damage 
to the cargo interest. A broad interpretation of the wording could support the 
latter option, which means a loss arising from a delay in delivery would be 
                                                 
15 Hague, Hague-Visby art. 4 (1) and Hamburg art. 5 (1). See note 18-19 and 52 below. 
16 Hague, Hague-Visby art. 3(1) and Hamburg art 5 (1). N.B, in the Hamburg rules, the due 
diligence obligation of seaworthiness is not only limited to before and at the 
commencement of the voyage, but also during the voyage. See W. Tetley, Marine Cargo 
Claims (Montréal, BLAIS International Shipping Publications, 1988, 3rd ed) at 369 and 
396. 
17 Not only at the commencement of the voyage if the Hamburg rules are applicable on the 
bill of lading, see note 17.  
18 International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law Relating to Bills of 
Lading, Brussels 25 August 1924, “The Hague rules”.  
19 Protocol to Amend the International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules of 
Law Relating to Bills of Lading, Brussels 23 February 1968, “The Visby Protocol” or  “the 
Hague-Visby rules”. 
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possible to recover from in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules.20 It is, 
however certain, that in order to interpret delay as being part of the rules, it 
has to be with reference to the contract of carriage, either expressly agreed 
upon or implied by the intention of the parties.21 The effect of interpreting 
delay as part of the rules is that limitations and other defences will be 
available to the carrier.  
2.3.1 Reasonable delay 
The obligation by a carrier to deliver goods within a reasonable time follows 
explicitly or implicitly from the contract of carriage. If the parties to a 
contract of carriage agree on a specific time of delivery, time is of the 
essence of the contract. By having an express stipulation in the contract for 
timely delivery of the goods, the consequences arising from breach of the 
time stipulation must be foreseeable to the carrier in accordance with the 
test created in Hadley v. Baxendale (see chapter 2.1.2 above).  
 
More complicated is the situation where the parties failed to agree on such 
time limit. In lack of a clear agreement, one has to consider what follows 
from law, custom or usage at the port of arrival. Naturally, this differ 
depending on what jurisdiction the court or interpreter is located. In absence 
of such rules, goods ought to be delivered within the time a diligent carrier 
would use, all the circumstances in the case considered.22 As a conclusion, 
where time is not of the essence of the contract, the carrier has a duty to 
carry goods with reasonable dispatch. Yet is to determine what a reasonable 
delay is.  
 
Being reasonable means that the carrier does not need to take any measure 
to fulfil his obligation, but, as the wording expresses, reasonable measures 
only. In English law, the notion has been discussed in Hick v. Raymond & 
Reid23. The rationale of the case can be summarized by the following quote 
by Lord Watson: “When the language of a contract does not expressly, or 
by necessary implication, fix any time for the performance of a contractual 
obligation, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable 
time. The rule is a general application and is not confined to the contracts 
of carriage of goods by sea /…/ notwithstanding the protracted delay, so 
long as such delay is attributable to causes beyond his control, and he has 
neither acted negligently nor unreasonably”. The conclusion to be drawn 
from this case is that English law provides a duty of reasonable dispatch 
even though it is not implied (or expressed) in the contract of carriage. The 
                                                 
20 N.B The question on whether, or not, delay is considered as part of the rules is in the end 
a national matter.  The answer differs between jurisdictions, i.e. there is no universal 
answer to this question.  
21 Hague and Hague-Visby art. 4 (1) and (2).   
22 H. Karan, The carrier’s liability under international maritime conventions, the Hague, 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg rules (Lampeter, The Edwin Mellen Press Ltd. 2004, 1st ed) at. 
215. 
23 Hick v. Raymond & Reid (1893) A.C 22 (H.L). 
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notion of “reasonableness” seems to be equivalent to not being negligent in 
forwarding the goods.  
 
The test is objective. If a diligent carrier is found to need ten days to 
complete a voyage and the carrier under judgement had done it in 21 days, 
the delay is likely to be found unreasonable. However, as Max Ganado 
points out in the book “The law of delay in the carriage of general cargoes 
by sea”, depending on the circumstances in each case, what is reasonable 
delay in one case might as well be unreasonable in another. Factors that 
courts have to consider are not only the delaying events during the voyage, 
but also the condition of the ship, the technical equipment used for cargo 
handling and other circumstances regarding the cargo that is known to the 
contracting parties. This means circumstances in one case might give 
support to measures taken by the carrier to be justifiable, for instance 
weather conditions or perils, whereas the same peril could be considered not 
to be justifiable for another carrier.24
2.3.2 Case law 
In the case Parnass International v. Sea-Land service25, the carrier was 
allegedly 18 days late delivering bulk goods to the counterpart. The issue 
was whether the delay was reasonable under USCOGSA section 1304 (4)26 
and whether it constituted a deviation27 as defined by the law. The 
consignee claimed damages for decline in market value and that the delay 
was a breach of the alleged 30 day transit time agreed upon in the contract. 
According to the plaintiff, Parnass, the delay in delivering the goods had 
caused subsequent buyers to cancel their orders. Furthermore, the market 
value had dropped 20 percent during the 18 days. The delay was mostly due 
to a port congestion at one of the ports of call in which a strike was at hand. 
Moreover, the defendants used a relay system in which cargo was forwarded 
and shifted between different ships during the voyage. The plaintiffs argued 
that such system was unreasonable and increasing the risk of delay in 
delivery. The court held the delay being reasonable on the following 
grounds. Firstly, Parnass must have known about the relay system, since 
they had done business with Sea-Land for many years, i.e. Sea-Land was 
acting in accordance with custom between the contracting parties. 
Moreover, the court held that even if the relay system would not be in 
accordance with trade customs, the delay would not be unreasonable with 
regards to the many risks that are involved in trans-oceanic shipping. The 
risk of port congestions makes it difficult to make promises on exact time 
for delivery. It could not be proven that the defendants made a promise as 
alleged by the plaintiffs, as it also would be unlikely for a carrier to give 
such promise under the prevailing circumstances.28  
                                                 
24 Ganado, supra note 1 at 37. 
25 Parnass International Trade & Oil Corp. v.  Sea-Land Service Inc. (1985) A.M.C 485. 
26 Hague rules art. 4 (4).  
27 “A departure by the carrier from the agreed or customary geographic route done without 
the consent of the cargo interests”. See Tetley supra note 11, at 41. 
28  Parnass International Trade & Oil Corp. v.  Sea-Land Service Inc. 
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In the US case American Cyanamid v. Booth29, the carrier deviated from its 
original geographical route in order to take advantage of spring tides and 
thus delivering cargo sooner. The plan failed and instead caused a delay in 
delivery. The court held the delay being reasonable as “what departure from 
the contract voyage might be a prudent person controlling the voyage at the 
same time make and maintain, having in mind all the relevant 
circumstances existing at the time, including the terms of the contract and 
the interest of all the people concerned, without obligation to consider the 
interest of any one as conclusive”. The attempts of saving time were 
regarded as being a decision taken by a prudent carrier and thus not 
considered as unreasonable.  
 
In the English case Boukadora Maritime Corp. v. S.A Marocaine30, the 
carrier was delayed due to problems that occurred during loading fuel oil as 
cargo. The shipper had presented false quantities of oil in the bill of lading31 
and the master of the ship refused to sign the bill of lading with the alleged 
quantities. The shippers claimed that the master had an obligation to sign 
the bill of lading without qualification and endorsement and contested the 
reasonableness of the refusal by the master. The master was right about the 
false presented quantities and the delay caused by the master was 
considered to be reasonable to justify the delay in delivery. 
 
If the carrier is required to make necessary repairs, the cargo owner has to 
accept the delay that follows. For the repairs to be excusable, they may not 
be an effect of the carrier’s negligence (neither as result of an unseaworthy 
vessel, as mentioned in chapter 2.2 above). During the repairs, the cargo 
owner may withdraw his cargo as long as he still provides what is required 
by him in the contract of carriage (normally paying freight). If the repairs 
take longer time than expected, the carrier will be liable for the extended 
delay only to the extent he failed to exercise due diligence finishing the 
repairs and in taking proper care of the cargo meanwhile. The obligation to 
take proper care of the cargo may under certain circumstances be to 
transship the cargo (for instance if the cargo is perishable) but the extra 
expenses occurring from such measures will likely be borne by the 
shipper.32  
 
2.3.3 Reasonable anticipation 
Under the Hague and Hague-Visby rules, the carrier has an obligation to 
reasonably anticipate a delaying event and exercise due diligence in 
                                                 
29 American Cyanamid Company v. Booth S.S Co. (1951) A.M.C 1505. 
30 Boukadoura Maritime Corp. v. S.A Marocaine de L’industrie et du Raffinage (1989) 
Lloyd’s Rep. 393.  
31 ”Not necessarily the complete contract of carriage, but the best evidence of carriage as 
well as receipt signed by the master or someone on his behalf indicating what order and 
condition the goods have been received onboard”. See Tetley supra note 11, at 13.   
32 Ganado, supra note 1 at 40. 
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preventing it. The carrier is presumed to be aware of causes that may delay 
the vessel. So, if the carrier is made aware that a port is at strike, he shall not 
visit that port. The leading case from this perspective is the Mormacsaga33 
from the Supreme Court of Canada. The carrier was delayed in delivering a 
cargo of oranges after having entered a port at strike with knowledge of this 
fact. The carrier claimed to have been informed that the strike was not 
probable to last as long as it did, however, the court did not find this a 
reasonable cause to breach the obligation to reasonably anticipate the strike 
as a delaying event and thus avoid entering the port.  
 
The obligation to avoid reasonably anticipated delaying events is especially 
strict if the cargo is perishable (such as in the Mormacsaga). The effect of a 
delay is obviously more significant to cargo owners of perishable cargo. 
Furthermore, the obligation burdens the carrier throughout the whole 
voyage, where reasonable measures need to be taken against any anticipated 
delaying event.34
2.3.4 Further obligations 
Even though the carrier is delayed for reasons that in chapter 2.3.1 above 
are seen as reasonable, the carrier might nevertheless be liable towards the 
cargo interests. The delaying events impose further obligations on the 
carrier, even though it was not at fault or negligent. The imposed obligations 
are such as informing the shipper of the delay, to care for the cargo during 
the delay, to overcome the delay and to resume the voyage as soon as the 
delaying events cease.35  
 
The court in the Mormacsaga36 reasoned with regards to this obligation. The 
carrier was carrying a cargo of oranges which is considered perishable. 
While stuck in the strike bound port, the carrier failed to care for the cargo 
of oranges. The oranges in the case were bound to be a total loss, 
nevertheless, the master on the Mormacsaga took no measures to save the 
oranges while in the port at strike. This was considered to be a clear breach 
of the obligation to take proper care of the cargo during the delaying event. 
The carrier has to take measures as to avoid the cargo becoming a total loss. 
This is a further obligation imposed to the carrier when the delay already is 
a fact. 
 
2.3.5 Excusable delays 
The Hague and Hauge-Visby rules contain strict rules in cargo handling, 
which means an act from the carrier to avoid delay might constitute a 
deviation, or even a fundamental breach of contract. In case of port 
congestion, the custom is to wait for your turn to enter the port and 
                                                 
33 Crelinsten Fruit v. The Mormacsaga, (1969) 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 515 (Ex. Ct. Can).  
34 Ganado, supra note 1 at 54. 
35 Ganado, supra note 1 at 51. 
36 The Mormacsaga, supra note 33. 
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discharge goods. Even though the carrier is obliged to carry with reasonable 
dispatch, the carrier might prohibited according to the contract of carriage to 
transship or replace the cargo as loaded in the port of loading. A 
fundamental breach of contract will deprive the carrier from all of his rights 
in the contract and, in some cases, even the limitations of liability.  
2.3.5.1 Statutorial defences 
An unreasonable delay (see chapter 2.3.1 above) might be excusable if one 
or more of the requirements in the list of possible defences37 was causing 
the delay. As mentioned above (see chapter 2.2 above), in order to invoke a 
defence, the overriding obligation of seaworthiness must be fulfilled and 
furthermore, the carrier must not be at fault. Thus, the carrier is not able to 
invoke any of the statutorial defences if he is negligent in performing his 
duties, he must invoke the defences available with “clean hands”.38  
2.3.5.2 Contractual defences 
In order to avoid a breach of contract, carriers usually make sure to include 
clauses in the contract of carriage in order to avoid liability for measures 
taken to avoid delays en route. The obligation of carrying cargo with a 
reasonable dispatch is difficult unless the carrier is able to take certain 
measures as to avoid delays. Port congestions and strikes are obstacles that 
can be overcome by transshipment or by deviating from the planned voyage. 
However, such measures might constitute a breach of contract by deviation 
unless the carrier is allowed to make these decisions as to overcome the 
obstacles by reference in the contract. 
 
The references in the contract that could solve the above mentioned problem 
are liberty clauses and disclaimers. The former permits the carrier to deviate 
or take measures with respect to cargo handling as to avoid a delay in 
delivery and the latter exempts the carrier from liability for an already 
occurred delay. The clauses can not be too broadly drafted since courts tend 
to protect cargo claimants by a restricted interpretation. Thus, a clause needs 
likely to specifically address the delaying event in order to exempt the 
carrier from liability. 39   
 
2.3.5.2.1 Liberty clauses 
Liberty clauses are drafted either in order to allow the carrier to deviate 
from the agreed geographical route, overcarry or return at a later date than 
agreed.  
 
Aside from the allowed deviation in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules,40 a 
carrier may be at liberty to deviate from the geographical route by a liberty 
                                                 
37 Hague, Hague-Visby art. 4 (2) (a)-(q). 
38 Ganado, supra note 1 at 94. N.B The defence for “error in navigation by the master or 
crew” in Hague, Hague-Visby art. 4 (2) (a) can be invoked regardless of the nature of 
negligence on which the defence actually is based. 
39 Ganado, supra note 1 at 104. See also Carver, T. G., Carriage by Sea, (London, Stevens 
& Sons, 1982, 13th ed.) at 541. 
40 To save life or property, Hague, Hague-Visby art. 4 (2) (l). 
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clause in the contract of carriage. However, to serve its purpose, the clause 
can not be to broadly drafted. The court might overlook the liberty clause if 
the liberty is considered to be unreasonable. Thus, only reasonable 
deviations can exempt the carrier from liability in a liberty clause. The 
House of Lords stated in Foscolo Mango41 that a departure from the 
contract (i.e. deviation) has to be what a prudent person would do in the 
same situation. The carrier have to bear in mind all relevant circumstances 
in the case, such as the terms of the contract and interests of all parties 
concerned, but without any duty to see any of the parties’ interest as 
conclusive. With this said, the contract clause is not conclusive when 
judging whether a delay was reasonable. Also other facts need to be taken 
into consideration when justifying the delay. The bill of lading in Foscolo 
Mango contained the following clause: “…with liberty to sail without pilots, 
to call at any ports in any order, for bunkering or other purposes or to make 
trial trips after notice. . .". The vessel had deviated from the agreed route to 
drop off an engineer. The basis of the case was therefore to interpret the 
wording of the liberty clause and whether dropping off the engineer was 
comparable to “bunkering or other purposes”. The taken measure was 
interpreted not to be covered by the clause and the carrier was held liable for 
the deviation. Thus, courts construe such clauses narrowly. Any deviation 
falling outside the exact wording in the liberty clause is considered null and 
void according to the Hague and Hague-Visby rules.42   
 
In spite of the clear case law, a number of bills of lading contain such liberty 
clauses. Case law considering liberty clauses null and void often base the 
nullity on a too broadly drafted clause. Thus, narrowly drafted liberty 
clauses could be held valid. Max Ganado is of the opinion that there is no 
point in including a liberty clause for deviation in the contract, since such 
clause is void anyways. Other authors (such as Thomas Carver) find that the 
clause allowing the carrier to deviate actually defines the geographical 
route. Thus, such clause is not subject to the nullity ground of the rules, 
since the obligation of the carrier is not lessened. In other words, as the 
geographical route not is defined in the contract, the liberty to deviate 
constitutes the agreed route. Ganado’s view is supported by the American 
case General Electric v. SS Nancy Lykes43. The court held that “…the 
carrier may not define the voyage in such broad language as to render it 
impossible for any deviation to be found no matter how far the vessel 
wanders from the specified route”. The case Leduc & Co. v. Ward44 broke 
down a clause giving the carrier liberty to enter “any port at any order” only 
to be valid for ports substantially on the course of the voyage. The 
conclusion on this matter is that courts tend to construe liberty clauses 
restrictively.  
 
                                                 
41 Stag Line Ltd. v. Foscolo, Mango and Co. Ltd. (1932) A.C 328 (H.L). 
42 Hague, Hague-Visby art 3 (8). 
43 General Electric Co. v. SS Nancy Lykes, (1982) 536 F. Supp. 687 (D.C S.D.N.Y). 
44 Leduc & Co. v. Ward (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 475 (C.A). 
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In cases where liberty clauses have been approved by courts, the clauses 
have been subject to a specific situation. Furthermore, they have to be 
drafted in good faith and not exclude liability for negligence by the carrier. 
In an American case, Dietrich v. US Shipping Board Emergency Fleet45, the 
contract stipulated that the carrier was free to re-arrange loaded cargo due to 
a renewal of the carrier’s fleet (what normally would be considered as a 
deviation and breach of contract). Since the re-arrangements caused a delay 
in delivery, the carrier was sued by the cargo owner. The court found the 
delay being reasonable in light of the drafted liberty clause. It was not 
drafted in bad faith and it was drafted to specifically cover situations where 
the cargo needed to be re-arranged. Thus, the carrier was not held liable for 
the delay and the clause valid.  
 
As a conclusion, if the carrier exercised his liberty to deviate and did it 
reasonably, he will not be liable under the contract of carriage. Thus, when 
having a liberty clause under consideration, the court is making a 
reasonability test whether to allow the occurred delay or not. With this 
rationale, it is not clear what purpose a liberty clause has. A reasonable 
deviation is lawful in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules even without a 
liberty clause.46 However, according to Max Ganado, the scope of the rules 
is likely to be limited to mere geographic deviations and not cover cases of 
overcarrying or transshipment as a mean to overcome a delay.47
2.3.5.2.2 Disclaimers 
Unlike liberty clauses, which give the carrier right to take measures in order 
to overcome delay, disclaimers explicitly exclude liability for an occurred 
delay. Courts tend to construe these clauses restrictively as well. Excluding 
liability is only allowed when the occurred delay is found to have been 
reasonable, a disclaimer can not exempt the carrier from liability for 
negligence.48 However, an American case opens for the possibility of 
disclaimers’ validity, but it is not without controversy. The ratio of the case 
is not clear. The court held that there is nothing in the Hague rules 
prohibiting a carrier to exclude liability for delay, provided that the 
exclusion is a reasonable one.49 It is likely that the ratio of the case has no 
value, since it is well established, at least in some jurisdictions, that the 
wording “loss or damage” in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules is not 
limited to physical damage (see chapter 2.3.1 above). If the court meant the 
carrier is able to exclude liability for reasonable delay only, the case is not 
of any use with respect to disclaimers, since reasonable delays are not 
prohibited in the rules.50
                                                 
45 Dietrich v. U.S Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp (1925) 7 F. 2d 889 (D.C N.D. 
Cal.). 
46 Hague, Hague-Visby art. 4 (4).  
47 Ganado, supra note 1 at 111. 
48 Which means CONLINEBILL, clause 13, which excludes liability for the carrier unless 
he acted in gross negligence ought to be void. “The carrier shall not be responsible for any 
loss sustained by the merchant through delay of the goods unless caused by the carrier’s 
personal gross negligence” Ibid.  
49 United Merchants & Manufacturers Inc. v. U.S Lines Co. (1953) 126 N.Y.S 2d 560. 
50 Ganado, supra note 1 at 113. 
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2.3.6 Limitation of liability 
In the chapters above, Hague and Hague-Visby have been treated 
synonymously, which is rather correct, since it is not much that differs 
between them. However, with regards to limitation of liability for carrier 
delay, there is a significant difference between the two protocols. The 
Hague rules contain no limitation for consequential damages. The Visby 
protocol, however, contain an express limitation for delay in its art. 4 (5) (b) 
when stating that the value of the goods shall be calculated at discharge or 
“should have been so discharged”. The maximum amount the carrier can be 
liable for is 666.67 units of account per package or unit or 2 units of account 
per kilogramme of gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is 
the higher.51  
2.4 The Hamburg rules 
The Hamburg rules52 have not reached any success with regards to 
implementations in national law. Only about 30 countries have adopted the 
Hamburg rules, of which only a few are major shipping nations. The 
Hamburg rules’ art. 5 (1) extends the obligation of the carrier to cover also a 
duty of carrying goods with a reasonable dispatch by adding “as well as 
from delay in delivery” to the obligation contained in the Hague and Hague-
Visby rules with regards to carrier liability.53  
2.4.1 Duty of timely delivery 
Delay is defined in 5 (2) of the rules to be what is expressly agreed upon or, 
in the absence of such agreement, what would be reasonable to require of a 
diligent carrier having regard to all the circumstances of the case.54 Thus, 
the obligation in art. 5 (1) in the Hamburg rules is two pronged. Firstly, 
there is a contractual obligation by the carrier of timely delivery and 
secondly an obligation without such express agreement. In other words, the 
Hamburg rules enacts the English principle established in Hick v. Raymond 
& Reid (see chapter 2.3.1 above) and imposes a duty on the carrier to carry 
goods with a reasonable dispatch, even without an express agreement 
between the parties. It is not necessary for an agreement to be in writing, 
courts would also give effect to an express oral statement. The statutorial 
obligation was drafted in order to avoid situations where carriers refuse to 
give the consignee an estimated time of arrival due to the risk of becoming 
liable for contractual delay. In other words, the drafters of the Hamburg 
                                                 
51 ”Unit of Account” is a calculated reference based on the largest currencies in the world 
(Euro, British Pound, Japanese Yen and US Dollar) and is less sensitive to market 
fluctuations and inflations. Is synonym to the Special Drawing Right (SDR). The daily rate 
can be found at the International Monetary Fund online: 
<http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx>. 
52 United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, Hamburg 30 March 1978, 
“The Hamburg rules”. 
53 Hamburg rules art. 5 (1).  
54 Hamburg rules art. 5 (2). 
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rules found the previous regulation (i.e. the Hague and Hague-Visby) being 
unsatisfactory and not enough cargo owner friendly.55 The regulation is 
inspired by delay provisions drafted in other fields of transportation (see 
chapter 3 below).56  
 
The obligation without express agreement is based on a reasonability test 
identical to the one under the Hague and Hague-Visby rules. The object of 
the reasonability test is to determine what a diligent carrier would have done 
in the same situation as the carrier under judgement, taking all the relevant 
circumstances in the case into account. When determining the reasonability 
of a delay under the Hamburg rules (i.e. determining whether a delay 
occurred or not), circumstances arisen after the parties entered into the 
agreement are normally not considered. Only circumstances known to the 
parties at the time of entering the contract shall be subject to the 
reasonability test. Note that the reasonability test is only when the parties 
failed to stipulate a time for delivery, there is nothing in the rules preventing 
the parties from agreeing upon an unreasonable delivery date. One author 
suggested carriers to incorporate a date in their bills of lading stipulating a 
time of delivery so far ahead, that delay would be out of the question. 
However, there is little doubt that the consignee not would accept such act 
by the counterpart.57
 
Art. 5 (3) of the rules contains a provision which further protects the cargo 
claimant from delay in delivery.  The provision gives the cargo claimant an 
opportunity to treat the goods as lost unless the cargo is delivered within 60 
days from the date agreed in the contract of carriage. The claimant is not 
obliged to treat the goods as lost, but is free to await the cargo if he wishes 
to do so. The stipulation eliminates the issues that could arise under the 
Hague and Hague-Visby rules with regards to calculation of damages for 
delay in delivery.58
2.4.2 Defences 
The carrier is presumed to be at fault if delay in delivery is proven by the 
cargo claimant. Thus, the burden of proof is on the carrier to exculpate 
himself from liability for delay. The Hamburg rules do not have a list of 
possible defences, but a single provision leaving it to the court (or whoever 
is in the position to judge) to determine what is to be considered a justifiable 
delay. Art. 5 (1) stipulates that the carrier is not liable if he proves that he 
took “all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the occurrence 
                                                 
55 J. F. Wilson “Basic carrier liability and the right of limitation” in Samir Mankabady, The 
Hamburg rules on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (London, The Chameleon Press Ltd. 
1978, 1st ed.) at 146.   
56 UNCTAD, “The economic and commercial implications of the entry into force of the 
Hamburg rules and the Multimodal Transport Convention” (New York, United Nations 
Publications, 1991) at 110. 
57 Tony Kegels (ed), The Hamburg rules: a choice for the E.E.C? (Antwerp, MAKLU 
Uitgevers, 1994, 1st ed) at 149. 
58 Ibid at 152. 
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and its consequences”. The drafting is by many authors identified to be a 
typical civil law drafting, as opposed to the common law exhaustive drafting 
of defences that can be found in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules. Aside 
from the general defence, there is, however, a provision allowing the carrier 
to deviate (i.e. exempting the carrier from liability for the delay that 
follows) in order to attempt to save life or property.59
 
Contractual defences are allowed to the extent it does not lessen the liability 
for the carrier under the Hamburg rules.60 Thus, contract clauses that 
attempts to give the carrier liberty to deviate or disclaimers are prohibited to 
the same extent as in the Hague and Hague-Visby rules.  
2.4.3 Limitation of liability 
The Hamburg rules contain an explicit limitation for carrier liability with 
regards to delay in art. 6 (1) (b). The maximum amount that the carrier can 
be liable for is two and a half times the freight payable for the goods 
delayed, but not exceeding the total amount of freight paid. 
2.4.4 Nordic law 
The Nordic countries have not officially signed the Hamburg convention, 
but the Nordic Maritime Codes have to a large extent incorporated the 
provisions contained in the Hamburg rules. Carrier liability for delay was 
established by law already in the 1970’s. The delay provision is identical to 
the one stipulated in the Hamburg rules, where the carrier is liable for delay 
by reference in contract, or in absence of such contract, what is reasonable 
with regards to the circumstances could reasonably be required by a diligent 
carrier.61 In the preparatory works of the Norwegian Maritime Code the 
legislators justified such an enactment with the following words: “Modern 
carriage of general cargo imposes increasingly stringent requirements with 
respect to regularity and speed in performance of the transport. The Code’s 
requirement of due despatch must be viewed in this light. Delay will be 
deemed to have occurred where the voyage exceeds what would be 
reasonable time in light of the planned carriage and the marketing 
thereof”.62 In commerce practise in the Nordic countries it was not common 
with an express stipulation of time for delivery in the contract of carriage, 
wherefore such stipulation by law was considered to be required in the law 
in order to protect cargo owners from carrier delay.63
  
The Nordic Maritime Codes differ from the Hamburg rules with regards to 
limitations. When the laws were drafted, the legislators decided to keep the 
limitations as found in the Visby protocol. The standpoint taken is in favour 
                                                 
59 Hamburg rules art. 5 (6). 
60 Hamburg rules art. 23. 
61 See for instance the Swedish Maritime Code, s. 13:28 § (Sjölagen), SFS 1994:1009.  
62 NOU 1993:36 at 28. 
63 Falkanger, T., Bull, H.J., Brautaset, L., Scandinavian Maritime Law, the Norwegian 
Perspective (Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 2004, 2nd ed.) at 293.   
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of the cargo claimant, since the Hamburg rules’ ceiling is calculated in light 
of the cargo value as a whole and not considering the value at the port of 
discharge. The Nordic Maritime Codes are thus keeping the limits where the 
value of the goods is the port of discharge is the basis for calculating the 
limitation. The result is most likely a compromise between the interests 
advocating the incorporation of the Hamburg rules as a whole and their 
opponents.64
 
                                                 
64 Ibid at 97. N.B The Danish Maritime Code differ from the rest of the Nordic countries, 
since the Danish parliament chose to incorporate the Hamburg rules’ limitation. 
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3 Delay in other fields of 
transport 
3.1 Carriage of goods by road 
Contractual relationships in road transportation are commonly governed by 
CMR.65 The Convention has around 50 parties, however, mostly European 
nations. The nature of transporting goods by road is different from sea 
transport, as the environment is more predictable and possible obstacles for 
the carrier are fewer. Furthermore, road transport has less tradition than 
maritime law (which goes back thousands of years) and contain less 
principles that are recognized and customary for the contracting parties. 
Thus, a delay regime within the scope of road transport is not as 
controversial as in maritime law. 
 
Art. 17 (1)-(5) of the CMR covers carrier liability for delay in delivery. As 
follows from the wording of the paragraph, “any delay in delivery” falls 
within the ambit of the provision. The carrier is liable at all times unless he 
proves that the reason for the occurred delay was beyond his control. The 
carrier is neither liable for wrongful acts or neglect by the claimant. 
However, just like the overriding obligation of seaworthiness in maritime 
law, the carrier is prevented from all defences available if the delay was a 
result of a defective vehicle. If the carrier proves that the delay was due to 
circumstances beyond his control, the delay is considered as excusable.66  
 
The carrier has to consider certain circumstances in planning the voyage and 
agreeing upon a timely delivery with the consignor. An icy road is not a 
defence that typically is allowed as exculpating the carrier from delay, this 
is something the carrier ought to have considered in the planning of the 
voyage. The same applies for detentions at public authorities. The carrier 
ought to count on a long stop at customs in a country where the public 
authorities are known for taking time in retaining goods for inspection. 
However, delay caused by an unlawful detention of cargo by public 
authorities should serve as a typical defence to constitute delay as being 
lawful. Defences available to the carrier are dependent upon whether he had 
good reason to anticipate the circumstances occurred. Thus, a road that 
normally is open and where the traffic normally flows without problems 
which temporarily is jammed should act as defence, whereas problem with 
obtaining a visa for the driver is not.67
 
                                                 
65 Convention on the Contract for International Carriage of Goods by Road, Geneva 19 
May 1956, “CMR”. 
66 Clarke, M. A., International Carriage of Goods by Road: CMR (London, Lloyd’s of 
London Press Ltd., 2003 4th ed) at 220. 
67 Ibid. 
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Damages for delay causing pure economic loss are allowed in the 
convention. The wording itself in art. 23 (5) could be rather ambiguous 
stipulating compensation for “damage”. However, it was soon established 
that pure economic loss is recoverable under the provision.68  
 
Liability is imposed on the carrier for delay after agreement as well as for 
delay after a reasonable time for delivery has elapsed. Art. 19 is covering 
both of the situations. The reference to an agreed time limit is not limited to 
cover only agreements in the consignment note. This means, if the carrier 
has advertised upon a timely delivery or such agreement is made orally, 
such statement is binding. In an agreed time limit, the parties are free to 
agree upon any conditions they wish. Any breach (outside the carrier’s 
control) of such condition is considered a breach of contract and leads to 
reprisals for the carrier. Agreed time limits are seldom subject to 
interpretation, if the carriage arrived later than agreed, the carrier is liable. 
 
It can be questioned whether the carrier is liable for delivery made too soon. 
Naturally the carrier can not be held liable for delay as defined in the CMR, 
however, the cargo owner have a right to decline delivery until the time has 
reached a point within the agreed scope in the contract. If the carrier 
delivers too soon is more a question of breach of other duties in the contract 
rather than delay.69
 
If the contracting parties fail to agree upon a date of delivery, the carrier is 
obliged to deliver within a time a reasonable carrier would use for the same 
voyage, considering the circumstances of the case. What shall be considered 
as reasonable is determined by the interpreter from time to time and such 
judgement ought to be fairly arbitrary. However, the guidance that has been 
given in case law is that in cases of partial loads, one has to consider the 
time required for making up a complete load in the normal way. Thus, the 
cargo owner of the partial load has to consider the additional time it takes 
for the carrier to load and handle other consignors’ cargo (unless the parties 
agrees on otherwise). Factors that one has to consider when taking relevant 
circumstances under judgement are nature of the goods (more perishable 
goods are required a sooner delivery), the type of vehicle used, any 
instructions given by the consignor, the permitted driving hours, road 
conditions and other factors that might affect the carriage en route. In some 
countries, the customs could be more time demanding than others, some 
countries could have political instabilities form time to time etc. The 
conclusion is that whatever obstacle the carrier is facing, the judgement to 
be made is whether he acted reasonably in order to overcome the situation.70     
 
Art. 23 (5) of the convention stipulates a limitation of liability for the carrier 
after an occurred delay to the amount of the accumulative charges for the 
carriage. 
                                                 
68 Ibid at 177. 
69 Ibid at 175. 
70 Ibid at 176. 
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3.2 Carriage of goods by air 
The paramount reason for a cargo owner choosing carriage by aircraft is 
most likely for the speed and possibility of delivery within a short period of 
time. The cargo owner actively chooses the transport form regardless of the 
higher freight because he is dependent upon a timely delivery of the goods. 
Therefore, the consequences of delay in delivery are therefore even more 
crucial in aviation law than in any other field of transport. Time is of the 
essence of every contract of carriage. 
 
The convention that covers air transport is the Montreal Convention.71 It 
amended the former Warsaw Convention and was signed in 1999. The 
convention applies to all international carriage of cargo (as well as persons 
and baggage) performed by aircraft for reward.      
 
Art. 19 covers carrier delay and stipulates the following: “The carrier is 
liable for damage occasioned by delay…Nevertheless, the carrier shall not 
be liable for damage occasioned by delay if it proves that it and its servants 
took all measures that could reasonably be required to avoid the damage or 
that it was impossible for it or them to take such measures”. Thus, as for the 
burden of proof, the same principle applies as in other fields of transport. 
Once the claimant has proven delay, there is a presumption that the carrier is 
at fault and it has to exculpate itself from this presumed fault.  
 
Delay is when the cargo did not arrive on the date and at the hour explicitly 
stipulated or indicated in the carrier’s timetable. However, courts and 
authors have established that any delay does not constitute delay per se, but 
merely abnormal delays are meant to be covered by the notion of delay in 
the convention. An abnormal delay is resulted by the carrier’s lack of taking 
the appropriate measures to ensure departure and arrival of the aircraft at the 
times explicitly specified or indicated in the timetable. In older law within 
the common law system, it was established that the reasonability test were 
to apply on air carriage performed without a contract. However, since 
contracts always are issued for air carriage, this principle is at this day 
obsolete.  
 
There is nothing in the rules limiting when the delay must arise in order to 
impose liability on the carrier. Delay might arise before departure, during 
the voyage or after the arrival of the aircraft. This follows implicitly by 
interpreting the period of responsibility in the convention.72
 
Art. 23 of the Montreal Convention prohibits contract clauses which partly 
or fully relieve the carrier from liability resulting from delay. Such clauses 
are null and void. Case law is clear construing this provision and 
                                                 
71 Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules for International Carriage of Goods by 
Air, Montreal, 28 May 1999 “The Montreal Convention”. 
72 Mankiewicz, R. H., The liability regime of the international air carrier (London, Kluwer 
Law International, 1981 1st ed) at 186. 
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disclaimers are regularly held unlawful. One exception can, however, be 
mentioned. In the American case Atlantic Fish v. Pan American Airways73 
(which was subject to the equivalent rule under the Warsaw Convention) a 
disclaimer was held valid due to special circumstances. The airline had 
exempted delay for other airlines’ delay and this was allowed from which to 
exempt according to the court. Since the occurred delay was due to a 
subcontracting airline, Pan-American Airways was not liable for the delay 
under the clause. 
 
Courts have applied art. 19 strictly and have held the carrier liable for any 
kind of abnormal delay unless he could discharge the burden of proof that is 
required. The requirement of reasonable measures to overcome delay is set 
high. In Iran Air v. Société générale de Géophysique74 (also subject to the 
equivalent Warsaw Convention rule) the carrier was held liable for partial 
delay. Goods had been left behind in Paris and did not reach the designated 
destination in Iran until 17 days later. The carrier failed to prove that he 
took reasonable measures to ship the goods on another aircraft. The court 
took into consideration the existence of many direct and indirect 
connections between Paris and Teheran that the carrier could have used in 
order to fulfil his obligation to the consignor.  
 
As well as in other fields of transport, perishable cargo increases the 
obligation of timely delivery by the carrier. In one case, the carrier had 
breached an agreement where he was prohibited to overnight stopovers. It 
was carrying a load of perishable fruits and due to the nature of the cargo, 
the negligent behaviour of making an overnight stopover was considered to 
be a fundamental breach of contract. Liability was imposed on the carrier 
for the occurred delay without any limitations.75   
 
As for the limits of liability, one can see significantly higher amounts than 
in other fields of transport. The maximum amount a carrier is liable for with 
respect to delay in delivery of cargo is 17 SDRs per kilo. This amount might 
be increased if the consignor has made a special declaration of interest in 
delivery (which in practise probably only is possible if the consignor pays a 
supplementary sum).76  
 
3.3 Carriage of goods by rail 
There are a number of international conventions covering international 
carriage of goods by rail. The various conventions have with time been 
annexed in one big convention covering all forms of rail carriage. This 
                                                 
73 Atlantic Fish and Oyster Corp. v. Pan American Airways, 2 November 1948, Illinois 
Circuit Court, Cook County. 
74 Iran Air v. Société générale de Géophysique, 14 November 1974, C.A Paris.   
75 Mankiewicz, R. H., The liability regime of the international air carrier (London, Kluwer 
Law International, 1981 1st ed) at 193. 
76 Art. 22 (3). 
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convention is named COTIF.77 It has around 40 member states in various 
nations worldwide. The sub-convention of significance for carriage of 
general cargo on rail is CIM.78
 
The contracting parties to a contract of carriage by rail are bound to agree 
upon a transit period. In absence of such agreement, there are detailed time 
limits provided in CIM which the carrier is obliged to follow.79 The transit 
periods provided are based on how much cargo the consignor have on board 
the carrier (wagon load or less than wagon load) as well as the distance of 
the transport. The distance is defined as the agreed route or, in lack of such 
agreement, the shortest route possible.   
 
The carrier is liable for exceeding the agreed, or the statutorial, transit time 
in art. 23 for whatever railway infrastructure used. The same burden of 
proof is imposed on the carrier once the claimant has proved delay in 
delivery. The carrier is relieved from liability if it proves that someone else 
was at fault (however, not someone under the carrier’s vicarious 
responsibility) or if the delay was due to a defect in the goods forwarded or 
otherwise caused by circumstances that he was unable to avoid.   
 
The cargo owner may treat the goods as lost 30 days after the expiry of the 
transit time agreed upon or provided in the convention.80 When the person 
entitled to the goods has used the right to treat the goods as lost, the title 
holder may at the same time make a request to the carrier to be notified 
should the goods be recovered within a year. This gives the cargo owner a 
possibility to repay the refunded freight and have the goods delivered.  
 
The compensation for exceeding transit times shall not be higher than four 
times the carriage charge.81 However, if the consignor has made a special 
interest in delivery, the amount agreed upon shall be the limit of liability 
between the contracting parties. Thus, liquidated damages are overriding the 
statutorial limits in art. 33 by reference to art. 35 if the parties agree upon it. 
In order for the carrier’s limit of liability to be extended, the consignor 
explicitly has to declare the special interest in a timely delivery. The carrier 
can not be liable for more than the limit agreed upon, naturally the agreed 
limit can not be lower than the amounts provided in CIM. 
                                                 
77 Convention concerning International Carriage by Rail, Berne 9 May 1980, “COTIF”. 
Last modified in Protocol of 3 June 1999. 
78 Uniform Rules Concerning the Contract of International Carriage of Goods by Rail, 
Appendix B to COTIF, “CIM”.   
79 CIM art 16 (1) and (2). 
80 CIM art. 29.  
81 CIM art. 33. 
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4 Existing multimodal regimes 
This chapter will review existing regimes on the multimodal transport area. 
The heading might be somewhat misleading, since the European 
Community proposal is not an existing one (see chapter 4.5) and the 1980 
Multimodal Transport Convention is more or less obsolete (see chapter 4.2).  
4.1 Network or uniform liability? 
In a chain of transport it can be difficult to prove what caused the alleged 
loss or damage, or in this research, delay. This is resolved in the variety of 
multimodal regimes by a liability system in which the Multimodal Transport 
Operator (MTO) accepts liability towards the cargo owner throughout the 
journey. However, the responsibility that the MTO accepts is different 
depending on what liability system that is used. In a network liability 
system, the MTO accepts liability towards the cargo owner under the 
multimodal set of rules to the extent that it can not be proven where the 
delay occurred. This means, if a delay is proven to have occurred during the 
road part of the transport, the CMR rules are applicable. If it can not be 
proven where the delay occurred, the fall back provision in the multimodal 
regime is applicable. In a uniform liability system on the other hand, the 
MTO is liable under the multimodal rules at all times. Thus, the same 
liability rules are applicable throughout the whole transport. There is also a 
third alternative in this respect, which can be named a modified liability 
system. In this system, the uniform liability rules are applicable throughout 
the whole journey, whereas some mandatory provisions in unimodal law 
(such as limitations) are different depending on what stage of the journey 
the loss occurred.82
 
Chapter 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.3 will show examples of a modified liability system 
and chapter 4.5 of a uniform liability system. Chapter 4.4.1 will review a 
jurisdiction which has chosen the network liability system. 
4.2 The 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention 
The need of uniformity on the law of multimodal transport has been at hand 
for a long time, which is proven by the UN initiative which lead to the draft 
of the 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention. However, as the convention 
has not reached the required amount of 30 signing states, it is not at this day 
in force. Nevertheless, the substantial rules in the convention have inspired 
subsequent drafts of multimodal instruments. 
 
The convention is applicable on all multimodal carriage if the place where 
taken in charge or delivery of the goods is located in a contracting state. It is 
                                                 
82 UNCTAD, “Multimodal transport: the feasibility of an international legal instrument”, 13 
January 2003, online: <http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/sdtetlb20031_en.pdf> at 16. 
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a mandatory regime, but it recognizes the right of a consignor to choose 
whether he wants the transport to be governed by unimodal transport law.83
 
The convention presents a modified network liability system. Thus liability 
is governed by the convention regardless of whether the loss or delay is 
localized or not, whereas the monetary limits are governed by unimodal 
rules if the damage is localized to a particular stage of the voyage.84  
 
Liability for delay is provided in art. 16 of the convention. The MTO is 
therein liable for delay expressly agreed upon as well as delivery later than 
the time which it would be reasonable to require of a diligent MTO, having 
regard to the circumstances of the case. If the delivery is delayed with more 
than 90 consecutive days, the goods may be treated as lost.  
 
Even though the convention is not in force, a few countries have copied the 
rules in the convention and enacted them to have force in their jurisdiction. 
Egypt, for instance, have enacted the 1980 Multimodal Transport 
Convention as law (even though they’re not a signing state of the 
convention). At the same time, the government has established a licensing 
system for the operation of an MTO in the country. This measure is taken in 
order to control the quality of the companies acting as transport operators so 
that they conform with the international duties toward other nations trading 
under the rules of internationally binding treaties and conventions Egypt is 
part of.85   
 
Mexico, as a signing state of the convention has also adopted national rules 
identical to the ones provided in the 1980 Multimodal Transport 
Convention.86  
4.3 UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal 
Transport Documents 
Pending the entry into force of the 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention, 
ICC and UNCTAD gathered the commercial parties established in transport 
to develop a set of rules to apply for multimodal carriage. The rules are not 
applicable ex proprio vigore (by their own force) like the Hague and Hague-
Visby rules. The set of rules are purely applicable through incorporation by 
the contracting parties. Incorporation can be made in writing, orally or 
otherwise incorporated into the contract of carriage (i.e. how it is 
incorporated is more a question of proving applicability by the party which 
is alleging it).87
                                                 
83 Art. 3 (1) and (2). 
84 Art. 16 (1). 
85 UNCTAD, “Implementation of Multimodal Transport Rules” 25 June 2001, online: 
<http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/posdtetlbd2.en.pdf> at 44. 
86 Regulation on International Multimodal Transport, published in “Diario Oficial” on 7 
July 1989. 
87 UNCTAD/ICC Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents, online: 
<http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/multimod/mt3duic1.htm>. 
 29
 
The UNCTAD/ICC rules use a modified liability system, where the MTO 
accepts liability at all stages during the voyage. Naturally, stipulations on 
monetary limitations in the set of rules can not be contrary to the ones 
provided in the applicable mandatory conventions. The rules are only meant 
to function as supplement to contractual stipulations between contracting 
parties and the mandatory transport conventions prevent contracting parties 
to opt out certain matters (such as limitations).  
 
Article 5 (1) of the rules stipulates liability for the MTO for delay in 
delivery. The definition of delay is the same as in the Hamburg rules, 
namely if the goods have not been delivered within the time expressly 
agreed upon, or in the absence of such agreement, within the time which it 
would be reasonable to require from a diligent MTO, having regard to all 
the circumstances of the case. Thus, if the cargo claimant proves delay in 
delivery, the same presumption of fault applies as in mandatory transport 
conventions and the MTO has to prove that it was not at fault to be 
exempted from the occurred delay.  
 
One important difference from the Hamburg rules has to be highlighted. The 
MTO is not liable for an occurred delay unless the cargo owner has made a 
declaration of interest in timely delivery, which also has been accepted by 
the MTO. The declaration can thus be seen as an amendment to the contract 
of carriage and it is required that it can be proven that this declaration has 
been made.    
 
Furthermore, art 5 (4) states that the MTO is not liable for any occurred 
delay by sea or inland waterway if the delay is caused by an error in 
navigation or management of the ship or fire. Thus, the delay provision by 
sea is slightly more carrier friendly than if the delay occurred on land.   
 
The cargo owner might treat the goods as lost if the delivery has passed 90 
consecutive days following the date delivery should have been made in 
accordance with art. 5 (1).  
4.3.1 Commercial use 
The UNCTAD/ICC rules have shown to be successful with regards to use in 
commercial practise. Well established multimodal contracts of carriage are 
based on the rules, such as the FIATA Multimodal Transport Bill of Lading 
and the BIMCO Multidoc 95. The FIATA Bill of Lading contain a box on 
the front page under the headline “declaration of timely delivery of the 
consignor”. Thus, the consignor must declare that time is of the essence of 
before the freight forwarder signs the bill. In practise, this system makes it 
easy to prove whether time is of the essence.88   
                                                 
88 Ibid. 
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4.3.2 Implementation in international agreements 
Aside from pure contractual implementations, the UNCTAD/ICC rules have 
also been incorporated through legislation in national law and model for 
internationally binding treaties. For instance, the delay provision contained 
in the rules have been enacted in three separate agreements on international 
multimodal transport in South America.89 Thus, the South American 
countries have found the declaration of interest by the cargo owner to be a 
functioning way to stipulate liability for delay. 
4.4 National multimodal regimes- a brief 
comparison 
There are a number of states that have enacted national laws on multimodal 
transport. This chapter will briefly review the delay provisions in some of 
those jurisdictions. Having a national law on multimodal carriage might 
conflict with other applicable international regimes, but the conflict of laws 
perspective will not be dealt with in this research. The comparison will 
merely be an analysis on the delay provisions existing in national law. The 
specific nations are chosen because the three countries have chosen to enact 
different delay provisions. China imposes liability only after agreement, 
Germany both after agreement as well as within a reasonable time and India 
only after a declaration of interest is made. 
4.4.1 Germany 
Germany adopted a law in 1998 which object is to govern multimodal 
transport.90 It applies on transports with at least two modes of carriage over 
land, inland waterways or by aircraft. Thus, the law is not aimed to cover 
multimodal carriage where the main part is by sea. The regulation is based 
on a network liability system, which means if the delay is localized to have 
arisen during a certain stage on the voyage, the rules governing this mode of 
transport prevails. The burden of proof is on the claimant, or whoever is 
alleging the occurred loss. However, the parties may agree upon the general 
multimodal rules to be applicable, even if it is proven where the damage 
arose. Naturally, the parties may not agree upon conditions that would 
violate international binding agreements (such as the limitations in the 
Hague-Visby rules) as they apply ex proprio vigore.91
 
The basis of liability is mainly taken from the CMR rules on carrier liability. 
Thus, the carrier is liable for any damage resulting from delay in delivery, 
                                                 
89 The Andean Community (Bolivia, Colombia, Equador and Peru), decision 331 of 4 
March 1993; MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay), Partial Agreement 
for the facilitation of Multimodal Transport of Goods 27 April 1995; ALADI (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and 
Venezuela), agreement on International Multimodal Transport 1996. 
90 German Commercial Code (Handelsgesetzbuch) arts. 452-466,  as revised 25 June 1998 
(Transport Law Reform Act). 
91 German Commercial Code art. 452 (a) and (d). 
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both due to specific agreement as well as what is to be reasonably expected 
from a reasonable carrier. The limit of liability for delay is fixed to three 
times the freight.92
4.4.2 China 
China has several laws that are applicable on multimodal carriage. All 
together, they cover the full scope of multimodal carriage. For instance, 
when there is a sea-leg involved in the multimodal carriage, the Maritime 
Code applies. When the multimodal carriage is performed without any 
maritime transport, the Contract Law applies.93  
 
Under the Maritime Code, the carrier is held liable in art. 50 for delay if the 
parties agreed on a timely delivery. Thus, there is no “statutorial” provision 
making the carrier liable for delay when the contracting parties failed to 
agree on such time. The carrier can invoke the same defences for an 
occurred delay as for other damages. The Chinese Maritime Code is unique 
compared to other laws on multimodal transport, as it explicitly gives the 
cargo claimant right to pure economic loss by statute. The Code defines 
pure economic loss as it states that the carrier is liable also “for economic 
losses arising from delay in delivery even without actual loss of, or damage 
to, goods unless such economic losses occurred from causes for which the 
carrier was not liable”. Furthermore, the goods might be treated as lost by 
the cargo owner unless delivery is made within 60 days from the agreed 
delivery date, thus an inspiration from the Hamburg rules.94 Damages 
resulting from delay are limited to the freight paid for the goods. Thus, a 
lower limitation for the carrier than most other transport conventions and 
laws in the world.95
   
As for other forms of multimodal carriage, general contract law applies and 
there is nothing stipulated on delay. Hence, liability for delay is also in this 
perspective imposed only after express agreement by the contracting parties.  
4.4.3 India 
The Indian Multimodal Transport of Goods Act from 199396 applies from 
any place in India to a place outside India. The Act has the same delay 
provision as provided in the UNCTAD/ICC rules, thus, the cargo owner 
needs to provide a declaration of interest to the carrier which the carrier has 
to accept.97  
 
                                                 
92 German Commercial Code art. 431 (3). 
93 The Chinese Maritime Code 1993, Chapter IV, Section 8, Special Provisions regarding 
Multimodal Transport Contracts; The Chinese Contract Law 1999, Chapter 17 section 4: 
Contracts for multimodal transportation. 
94 The Chinese Maritime Code art. 50. 
95 The Chinese Maritime Code art. 57. 
96 The Indian Multimodal Transportation of Goods Act 1993, (No 28 of 1993). 
97 Sec. 13 (1). 
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The provision on delay states that the carrier is liable for any delay and 
consequential damages arisen from such delay if the loss occurred during 
the time the MTO was in charge of the goods with reference to the contract 
of carriage. The system is a modified liability system, where the carrier is 
liable towards the cargo owner at all times under the Act, but the limitations 
are subject to unimodal law if the damage or delay is localized to a 
particular stage of the voyage.  
 
The claimant may treat the goods as lost if the carrier has failed to deliver 
within 60 consecutive days from the agreed delivery date. Furthermore, the 
limitation of liability for delay is the freight paid for the carriage.98  
4.5 The European Community proposal 
The need for a set of rules covering multimodal transport is established. 
However, most commentators are anticipating a long process on a global 
level before all parties involved can agree on an internationally binding 
multimodal instrument (see chapter 5 below). Therefore, the European 
countries have initiated a process of creating a set of rules within the 
European Union that can function as role model for the further development 
of a binding convention on a global level. The directorate general of Energy 
and Transport of the European Union has appointed some of the leading 
commentators within the member states to prepare a first draft as proposal 
to the European Commission. The report99 (ISIC) was filed in October 2005 
and the draft is at this point revised by the Commission. The European 
initiative is not aiming to create a set of rules in competition with 
UNCITRAL. The main objective of the rules is to create a regime that can 
be evaluated and tested on a global level and maybe work as a role model 
for a subsequent international regime. Two main characteristics can be 
highlighted on the European draft. Firstly, the name of what most 
commonly is called “multimodality” is in the European report called 
“intermodality”. Secondly, the application of the set of rules shall be on a 
voluntary basis. The rules will apply within the Community without any 
reference in the contract of carriage, but, the contracting parties shall have 
the opportunity to opt out the rules in the contract of carriage. Thus, the 
objective is to cover only contractual relationships that have not actively 
chosen the rules not to apply.  
 
The set of rules have, as opposed to most other multimodal liability systems, 
imposed a strict liability on the MTO in a unimodal liability system.100 
Thus, it is a simple regime without any issues with regards to determining 
where loss or damage arose on the voyage. The defences available for the 
                                                 
98 Secs. 13 (2) and 16.  
99 Clarke, M. A., Herber, R., Lorentzon. F., Ramberg, J. “Integrated Services in the 
Intermodal Chain”, Southampton, 28 October 2005, online: 
<http://ec.europa.eu/transport/logistics/consultations/2006_04_26/doc/2006_03_31_logisti
cs_consultation_task_b_en.pdf>.  
100 In the report, the MTO is named “Transport Integrator”, but I will continue using MTO 
in order to retain conformity in the paper. 
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MTO are less favourable to the carrier than in most other regimes. The 
defence for an occurred loss is suggested to be only those that are 
comparable to force majeure.101 As for the limitation of carrier’s liability, it 
is suggested that 17 SDRs per kilo is appropriate. Thus, no package 
limitation is enacted and the same limit is applicable throughout the voyage 
regardless during which stage of the voyage the damage arose.102  
 
In art. 8 (1) of the report, it is stipulated that liability is imposed for delay in 
delivery. Delay in delivery is defined in art. 8 (2) as “when the goods have 
not been delivered within the time expressly agreed upon by the parties to 
the contract of transport or, in the absence of such agreement, within a 
reasonable time, having regard to the circumstances of the case”. Thus an 
identical provision as the one contained in the Hamburg rules. The rules 
further give the cargo owner a right to treat the goods as deemed lost after 
90 consecutive days from the date when the goods where agreed to have 
been delivered or determined to have been delivered by a diligent carrier.   
 
                                                 
101 “Circumstances beyond his control”. Thus, not necessarily only force majeure 
situations. More precisely what the defence means is to be determined by courts in casu. 
See the report art. 8 (4).  
102 Art. 9 (1).  
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5 The UNCITRAL draft 
5.1 Historical background 
The concept of multimodal transport is not new, it was developed already in 
the mid 20th century along with the development of container transport. As 
the trade became more global than before, the container transport was found 
to be a satisfactory way of transporting goods long distances. The container 
is easy to load and reload and is suitable for a subsequent inland carriage. 
This means a consignee is less dependent on having his place of business 
close to a port. This evolution made shipping companies and freight 
forwarders to offer contracts of carriage in which they accepted 
responsibility towards the consignee for the whole chain of transport. In the 
complex world of international shipping with different languages, laws and 
commercial practises, cargo owners were offered a service where only one 
party was responsible for the cargo. This was shown to be an effective 
marketing measure. Nevertheless, the market needs rules to govern these 
transport operations. Problems arose as to what responsibility the carriers 
actually had towards the cargo owner. These problems lead to the 
development of the non-mandatory UNCTAD/ICC rules and the 1980 
Multimodal Transport Convention. As said above (chapter 4.3), the non-
mandatory contractual regime is rather successful, but there is a lack of 
mandatory rules on the area of multimodal transport.103  
 
Work was initiated by the CMI to develop a multimodal transport 
document. For years, the work in the organization had been focused on 
developing the Hague and Hague-Visby rules, but the work stranded 
because of the global need for a multimodal regime. The final draft was 
handed over to UNCTAD for further improvements. The preparatory 
measures by UNCTAD lead to a report, which is a summary of the different 
opinions in the industry with regards to a mandatory multimodal regime. 
The work of drafting the convention is now under the UNCITRAL umbrella 
and pending. Some commentators claim the different opinions with regards 
to the contents of the convention is making it impossible for a feasible 
convention to be drafted. As described below (chapter 5.1.2) the delay 
provision is one of the disputable articles. 
5.1.1 The UNCTAD report 
Even though multimodal transport contracts are commonly used today, the 
market is in need of a legal framework to cover issues that may arise. 
Contracts are subject to mandatory provisions in unimodal transport law 
and, dependent upon where the delay occurred, different rules are 
applicable. This is difficult to determine and creates unpredictability for the 
                                                 
103 UNCTAD, ”Multimodal Transport: short introduction”, online: 
<http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/multimod/mt2brf0.htm>. 
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contracting parties. Therefore, the UNCTAD report concludes a need for a 
multimodal regime that governs these matters. This opinion is supported by 
a broad consensus within the industry.  
 
The working group also concluded that the standard form contracts used by 
Multimodal Transport Operators (MTO’s) today are often favourable to the 
carrier. It is only major shippers and consignors that have the bargaining 
power to negotiate the terms in the standard agreements on the market. 
Therefore, the underlying principle for a mandatory regime is to protect 
smaller businesses. Smaller cargo owners will not have a chance to 
negotiate a timely delivery with the carrier. 
 
Of all the respondents to the questionnaire, 90 % stated that any instrument 
governing multimodal carriage should govern liability for delay. The basis 
for this is that all modern unimodal transport regimes contain liability 
provisions for delay. So is the fact for the 1980 Multimodal Transport 
Convention, as well as the modern multimodal contracts of carriage.104 
However, how liability for delay ought to be drafted was not proposed in 
consensus. Some of the delegates held liability for delay only should be 
imposed after agreement, but some held the increasing concern of a timely 
delivery should be considered as so important that liability should be 
imposed even without an agreement.105  
5.1.2 The pros and cons 
The provision is controversial in the process of drafting the convention. As 
a majority of all the nations participating in UNCITRAL is positive to a 
delay provision, there are also counterarguments to the drafting of a delay 
provision. The main argument used by the con-side is the same used by the 
pro-side with regards to including a delay provision. Jurisdictions that have 
enacted delay provisions have seen that the effect of having a provision is 
not very remarkable. The case law for delay in delivery is almost non-
existent, perhaps even more important, the successful attempts of the 
existing cases are even fewer. The pro-side is using this as an argument to 
enact a delay provision, since it doesn’t make a difference to draft a 
provision, as it won’t have any further effects than a system without a delay 
regime. The con-side is using the same fact arguing for the lack of a 
commercial need for a delay provision. 
 
With regards to a delay provision for liability without an express agreement, 
the con-side expressed concern that such imposed liability would lead to an 
increased amount of litigation. The pro-side expressed the anticipation of 
drafting of a statutorial obligation of timely delivery leading to increased 
litigation being exaggerated.106      
                                                 
104 BIMCO Combidoc and FIATA Bill of Lading, which both are based on the 
UNCTAD/ICC rules. See online: <http://www.bimco.dk> and <http://www.fiata.com>.    
105 Ibid. 
106 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its 
nineteenth session (New York, 16-27 April 2007) at 42. 
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5.1.3 The USA proposal 
The United States is of the view that a delay provision is to be excluded 
from the convention. Accordingly, delay provisions are not in line with 
public policy and to impose damages for delay will not work in practise. 
Furthermore, the American delegation expressed that imposing such 
liability would change the custom of most shipping nations and create a 
greater complexity and uncertainty in the law of transport. If damages ought 
to be possible to recover from, it shall be resolved amicably by the 
contracting parties, i.e. only by reference to an agreement between the 
parties. The delegation further expressed that the working group and all 
other delegations had overstated the meaning of the just-in-time 
management. That if a company needs protection for delay in delivery, it 
ought to be capable to include such condition in the contract of carriage.  
 
The American delegation also expressed concern over the further effects a 
liability regime for delay would have, especially with regards to increased 
insurance costs. Carriers facing exposure to this new liability will be 
required to purchase insurance to cover the potential liability. The costs will 
in the end be borne by the cargo owner by increased freight rates. 
Accordingly, the increased costs will not only be borne by the cargo owners 
that are shipping high value goods (that also have a greater need of a timely 
delivery), but also the ones who are shipping low value goods and are less 
dependent upon a timely delivery. 
 
As the American delegation concluded that delay liability should not be a 
part of the convention at all, they also forwarded a possible compromise. In 
this compromise, liability for delay could be remained in the draft, but only 
after an express agreement.107
5.2 The current delay provision 
Until the most recent draft, the delay provision in the UNCITRAL draft was 
identical to the one in the Hamburg rules, where liability was imposed for 
delay both after an express agreement as well as within what time of 
delivery that ought to be expected from a diligent carrier. The proposal was 
found to be controversial, not least after protests by the American 
delegation. The working group found that there was valid reasons to keep a 
provision covering carrier delay and not leave it up to domestic law to 
determine, but to what extent was not clear. Strong views were expressed to 
keep the part on delay liability also without an express agreement, since it 
was said to be the core of the whole provision. However, the working group 
finally deleted the wording on the ground that some delegations expressed 
                                                 
107 UNCITRAL, “Proposal of the United States of America on Carrier and Shipper delay”, 
4 April 2007, online: 
<http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V07/820/90/PDF/V0782090.pdf?OpenEleme
nt>.  
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their concerns that keeping the obligation without express agreement would 
lead to increase the risk of litigation.  
 
Thus, the provision on delay in the current UNCITRAL draft is only 
imposing liability on the carrier where there is an express agreement for a 
timely delivery.108  
 
 
                                                 
108 UNCITRAL, Report of Working Group III (Transport Law) on the work of its 
nineteenth session (New York, 16-27 April 2007) at 44. 
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6 Conclusions and 
recommendations  
6.1 Scope of a multimodal regime 
The main objective with creating a new set of rules for multimodal transport 
is to unify the existing laws on transport and make it easier and more 
predictable to apply rules on multimodal carriage. The complexity of 
today’s applicable rules is what initiated the process in UNCITRAL and the 
result of a draft must be in accordance with the main objective to have the 
effect that the parties in multimodal shipping are intending. The result must 
not be another complex legal regime added to the others, which more has 
the function of “food for lawyers”.109
 
The UNCITRAL draft is only applied where there is a sea leg involved in 
the multimodal carriage. Thus, it is not a true multimodal convention, but 
more of a maritime convention with additional set of rules for prior or 
subsequent inland carriage. The 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention is a 
true multimodal convention applied on all modes of carriage. In light of the 
main objective, one can question why the UNCITRAL draft omits to create 
rules for all kinds of multimodal carriage. Is the need for multimodal rules 
bigger where there is a sea leg involved? It might be so. The maritime 
conventions used by the majority of all the shipping nations are fairly old. 
The Hague rules are from the 1930’s and the Visby protocol is around 40 
years old at this day. Conventions for other modes of carriage have evolved 
with time, whereas maritime laws have stayed the same since they were 
created. Thus, the need for a set of rules might be bigger when one of the 
modes of transport is by sea. However, a set of rules failing to apply on all 
forms of multimodal carriage is not in light with the main objective of the 
multimodal convention. It does not eliminate unimodal law on transport. 
Unimodal transport law will still be applied and in one way, the UNCTRAL 
draft will be “lawyer food” if it can not be applied on all multimodal 
carriage. However, it is a step in the right direction towards a true 
multimodal regime. It could serve as a role model for subsequent 
conventions that are to be applied on all multimodal carriage. Furthermore, 
if the UNCITRAL draft succeeds with having Hague, Hague-Visby and 
Hamburg countries to sign, at least it has gained success with unifying the 
rules existing in maritime law.  
 
The UNCITRAL draft is misleading as to its application though. Johan 
Schelin states a good example in his article ”Carriage of Goods by Sea- the 
                                                 
109 As expressed by Johan Schelin, see ”Carriage of Goods by Sea- The UNCITRAL 
Convention” 2007, Ax:son Johnson Institute, Stockholm, online: 
<http://web.mac.com/johan.schelin/iWeb/MaritimeLawInstitute/Research/Research_files/R
avennaPaper.pdf>. 
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UNCITRAL Convention”.110 A rail carriage from Siberia to St. Petersburg 
and a subsequent sea carriage to Stockholm and a further land transport to 
Norway would be covered by the UNCITRAL draft. Yet, the sea leg is so 
short in comparison with the rest of the voyage, next to nominal. Ought the 
maritime plus convention to be applied on such voyage? This is a good 
example to use when criticizing the draft on its application. It is no answer 
as to whether it is a maritime plus or a true multimodal convention that is 
the best answer at this day. However, it is remarkable that almost the same 
carriage from Siberia to Norway by road through Finland is not covered by 
the convention. The question one has to answer is what it is about sea 
transport that creates the extra need for the UNCITRAL draft? Perhaps the 
answer lies in that a true multimodal convention would be to take a too large 
step from the legal tradition applied today. Maybe creating a true 
multimodal convention would be to take a too big step at once. The fact that 
the 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention did not reach any success could 
be one of the factors why the parties in UNCITRAL want to limit the scope 
of a new convention. I find this approach fairly reasonable, but I find that it 
is misleading to call it a multimodal convention. The same effect could have 
been reached by developing the existing maritime conventions to apply on 
subsequent or prior land transports. The work load would have been 
significantly lower and the effect would have been the same.    
6.1.1 Mandatory or opt out approach? 
Not all modes of carriage are in need of a multimodal regime. Bulk carriage 
and tanker carriage are transport types within maritime law that are usually 
not transported subsequently on land and which also normally are 
considered low value goods (considering the value vis-á-vis the weight 
carried). A multimodal regime is mainly for the purpose of container 
shipping and high value transport. If the need for a set of multimodal rules 
is not equal in the whole transport industry, why create a set of rules that 
apply equally on all kinds of cargo? Is the solution to have different 
stipulations for different cargo? That is doubtful. However, if the 
contracting parties are able to choose the application of the rules, the 
problem is solved. The 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention has the 
answer. It gives the contracting parties an option to choose unimodal 
transport law to govern their contractual relationship. This solution 
eliminates unnecessary application on a multimodal convention on transport 
that is not in need of the rules. Also, it is in conformity with the objective 
with the convention and does not create unpredictability to the parties. If 
they actively chose unimodal law to apply on their contract of carriage, they 
are fully aware of what set of rules that will be applicable on a future 
dispute. This answer does not eliminate unimodal law, but the solution is 
without doubt giving the contracting parties a predictable contractual 
relationship. 
 
                                                 
110 Schelin, supra note 109. 
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The rules should apply ex proprio vigore, unless the parties actively choose 
another set of rules to apply. To have voluntary rules that only apply after 
reference in the contract of carriage creates a too big responsibility on the 
contracting parties. Contracts of carriage need a set of rules of mandatory 
nature which not need to be incorporated in the contract to apply. Such rules 
would not be very different from the UNCTAD/ICC rules, perhaps with the 
only difference that other limits could be used in such convention. The 
European solution, with an opt out approach, is well considering the parties 
in low value shipping and transport that does not have the need for a 
multimodal regime. Those parties can actively agree on applying unimodal 
law in light of their needs and earlier custom.  
 
The solution is taking into consideration the large part of shipping that is 
containerized today and the predicted increase over the next couple of years 
(see footnote 2 above). Thus, letting the few contracting parties that are 
lacking the need of multimodal rules opt out the set of rules ought to be less 
problematic than letting the majority of all transporting parties to actively 
choose multimodal rules in the contract of carriage.  
6.1.2 Network or uniform liability? 
With regards to choosing a network or uniform principle, guidance has to be 
sought in the main objective with having a set of rules applying on 
multimodal carriage. The set of rules shall unify and make application more 
predictable than today. In this statement I also presume that, aside from 
predictability, decreasing the number of litigation and the complexity in 
proving claims under the rules is the object of the convention. With this 
said, the network principle is not satisfactory for multimodal carriage. In the 
network system, the rules only serve as fall back provisions if it can’t be 
proven where and how the loss arose. Thus, the costs for investigating facts 
for the claim and time spent in litigation will not to decrease significantly 
within this system. The network system does not serve the predictability in 
accordance with the main objective. Insurance companies and lawyers can 
not give their clients valuable advice for likely effects under the rules using 
the network liability system. This is because they are unaware of what set of 
rules that will apply. If the carrier fails to prove where the loss arose, the 
multimodal rules with one set of limitation will apply and if he succeeds the 
limitations in unimodal law will be applicable. This is not what I would 
define as predictable.  
 
I would not go as far as saying a network liability system is worthless, 
because it gives the cargo owner a fall back set of rules. Besides, the burden 
of proving the occurred loss is on the carrier, not the cargo claimant, since 
the well established presumption of fault still would apply under the 
UNCITRAL draft. Thus, the set of rules is definitely more cargo owner 
friendly than a system lacking multimodal liability rules. However, from a 
utilitarian and economic perspective of the law, a uniform liability system is 
making the system more predictable and less “food for lawyers”.  
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Furthermore, a network liability system could have the effect on the parties 
seeking to apply the rules which are the most favourable to them, so called 
forum shopping. This is certainly not in accordance with the main objective 
of the convention, as the set of rules are being abused and parties would 
spend a lot of money for legal counselling. Under a uniform liability system, 
the parties would not have this opportunity and would save the amount of 
legal costs that otherwise would be spent for the purpose of forum shopping. 
6.1.3 Limitations under uniform liability 
The European proposal suggests a uniform liability system and is unique in 
comparison to the various multimodal regimes existing today. Why is this 
idea revolutionary and not in use in other regimes to a larger extent? Well, 
the uniform liability system is probably seen by many as a system which is 
required, but it gets difficult effects. If the MTO is liable towards the 
contracting party no matter where the loss occurred, issues will arise in the 
subsequent stage of the judgement. The uniform liability system decreases 
the amount of money the parties will have to spend on investigation and 
litigation as to where the loss occurred, but this means that the MTO’s 
limitation will have to be equal for all modes of carriage. The European 
proposal sets the MTO limit of liability to 17 SDRs per kilo no matter what 
form of transport that was used when the damage or delay arose. This is 
problematical. The uniform liability system is satisfactory per se, but will 
the market accept such a high limit of liability? I doubt that maritime 
performing parties will agree on an increase of the limit from 2 SDRs per 
kilo as stated in the Visby protocol to 17 SDRs per kilo. Any other solution 
is, to my knowledge, not possible to find under a uniform liability system. 
The effect of decreasing costs for investigation and litigation on where the 
loss or damage arose will be useless if the same amount of investigation 
would have to be spent on investigating where the loss or damage arose for 
the purpose of limiting liability. Thus, if different limitations are stipulated 
for different modes of carriage, the whole purpose of the uniform liability 
system is defeated. This is perhaps an even more crucial issue in the 
UNCITRAL draft than the delay provision itself and also one of the reasons 
why UNCITRAL chose to draft a maritime plus convention instead of a true 
multimodal convention. 
 
Is there an amount that can be applied on all modes of carriage? Doubtfully. 
I reckon that there will be protests by the interested parties in European 
transport if 17 SDR per kilo is to be applied on all modes of carriage. The 
parties have an opt out opportunity in which they can avoid these high 
limits. However, the question is if what’s gained on having a uniform 
liability system is lost when parties instead will to a larger extent negotiate 
the terms of the contract as to avoid the high limitaions? It is naturally 
difficult to predict, but in order to have a uniform liability system, the only 
way of serving the purpose is to have the same limitations applicable on all 
carriage. Even though it will be difficult to enforce, I find that the solution is 
necessary. 
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6.2 The delay provision 
There are three possible solutions to the delay issue in the UNCITRAL 
draft. One option is leave out the provision and not impose any liability on 
delay in the convention. The second option is to impose liability in the 
convention, but only after agreement by the parties. The third alternative 
would be to have a statutorial obligation on the MTO for a timely delivery 
even when the parties failed to agree on a timely delivery. The third 
alternative is two pronged, since the obligation could be conditioned by 
adding a duty of declaring interest in a timely delivery on the consignor in 
order for the provision to be enforceable. 
6.2.1 Delay provision part of a multimodal regime at all? 
There are a number of reasons why delay should be part of a set of rules 
governing multimodal transport. Transport conventions for road, rail as well 
as air carriage all contain a delay provision. Furthermore, the multimodal 
rules as enacted in various national laws contain some sort of delay 
provision. The UNCTAD/ICC rules, that have gained success in the 
practical application as governing law for contractual relationships have 
delay as part of their liability regime. Even where delay is not incorporated 
in international conventions (read: the Hague and Hague-Visby rules) it is in 
most part of the world established by case law that delay is part of the rules 
even though the explicit words do not refer to delay. The UNCTAD report 
further gives support to the need for having some sort of delay provision 
contained in the UNCITRAL draft. To my knowledge, it is only the United 
States that opposes the view on having a delay provision as part of a 
multimodal regime at all. However, at the same time their opinion should 
not be exclusive in the draft process, their standpoint can neither be omitted 
from. In light of the main objective of unifying the applicable rules, failing 
to have USA as a signing state to the UNCITRAL convention would be a 
defeat of the whole purpose. It is one of the largest shipping nations in the 
world and the shipping nation that is making the applicable rules existing in 
the world so diversified. USA is the only state of significance using the 
Hague rules today. In other words, if more nations were to sign the Visby 
protocol, the diversified amount rules and the unpredictability would be less 
of a problem. Hence, USA is an important factor to include in the 
contemplation of fulfilling the main objective with the UNCITRAL draft. I 
would even go as far as claiming that if USA omits to sign the convention, 
the whole project could fail. It will only increase the amount of applicable 
rules in transport law and make it less predictable to the contracting parties 
to foresee what set of rules that might be applicable. The feasibility of the 
convention is dependent on USA, otherwise the draft might be a repeat of 
the Hamburg rules or the 1980 Multimodal Transport Convention.  
 
USA has no delay stipulation in their law of carriage of goods by sea. This 
means delay claims can only be enforced after an express agreement. It is a 
political standpoint taken by the American government. The possible 
compromise forwarded by the American government (of having a delay 
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provision only after express agreement) is an opening for USA as a signing 
state even if delay is stipulated in the draft. I think that USA is negotiating 
the UNCITRAL draft in good faith and with the intention to create an 
internationally binding instrument to govern multimodal transport. Thus, a 
delay provision as part of a multimodal regime or not ought to be only of 
editorial complexity rather than a real problem. The real problem is whether 
the provision should impose liability also without express agreement 
between the parties.  
6.2.2 Delay only after agreement 
As I earlier concluded, not all parties to shipping contracts are in need of a 
multimodal regime. It is not unlikely that the same parties that aren’t 
dependent upon a multimodal regime probably neither are in need of a delay 
regime. Low value goods are usually transported in large quantities. 
Furthermore, companies that are shipping large volumes are usually less 
dependent on the just-in-time delivery. It is the high value goods that form a 
part of this crucial just-in-time management that are highly affected by a 
delay. In fact, in many cases, the loss arising from delay can be many times 
bigger than the value of the shipped goods itself. This statement would be 
applicable to transport of technical equipment which is supposed to form 
components to something bigger. Delay in delivery of such components 
could stop the whole production line until the arrival of the crucial 
components and constitute outrageous amounts of loss.  
 
The question is if the parties to such transport contracts are able to refer to 
this importance in the contract of carriage and get the protection desired or 
if they need further protection by law? It is said that only the really big 
companies are able to negotiate terms in the contract of carriage. This leaves 
smaller businesses to an option of either signing the standard form contract 
or having to turn to another freight forwarder. It is my opinion that, since 
the terms of contracts are so difficult to negotiate, there is a need for extra 
provision protecting cargo claimants from delay even if the contracting 
parties have agreed upon a timely delivery. 
 
With reference to the case law referred to under chapter 2 above, there 
should be small practical effects by including a provision with a stipulated 
obligation after agreement. This is because most Hague and Hague-Visby 
regimes already recognize remuneration for carrier delay in maritime law 
after agreement between the parties. The practical effect of having a 
provision on delay would be that the limitation rules contained would be 
applicable, whereas a lack of a provision could create uncertainty whether 
the convention limitation rules would apply on agreement upon timely 
delivery in the contract. Thus, since the practical effects of a provision 
imposing liability after express agreement are merely of editorial nature, 
such drafting would not be very controversial. The controversial issue is 
whether liability could be imposed even without such agreement. 
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6.2.3 Statutorial obligation 
The statement from the pro-side of having a statutorial liability for delay in 
delivery would not lead to further disputes does not convince me. Even 
though countries with the imposed liability have not seen an increased 
amount of litigation, there is no doubt that claims will increase. This is not 
by court litigation, since such claims tend not to be large enough to be 
resolved in court. Such claims are likely to be resolved amicably among the 
parties or by alternative dispute resolution, but most likely by settlement 
among the parties at an early stage. A statutorial obligation will lead to 
greater risks by the MTO and less predictability. Having a stipulation on 
how a “reasonable carrier” should carry goods is not very predictable, since 
the judgement to be made is too arbitrary. There is no set time in advance 
acting as threshold for the carrier. It is also doubtful that transit times can be 
included in the convention as for carriage of goods by rail in the CIM-
COTIF. Sea carriage is too unpredictable for this to be possible and the 
distances of shipping goods by sea are significantly longer than for goods by 
rail. Thus, the lack of time limits in the “reasonable carrier” obligation is 
making it difficult in my opinion to impose a statutorial obligation on the 
carrier. However, I am of the opinion that some sort of extended protection 
is required to protect the cargo owner from delay in delivery.  
 
At the same time small businesses are in need of protection for delay in 
delivery for some cargo carriage, there are also businesses that are not in 
need of a timely delivery. This is a fact for the low value carriage. The 
American delegation expressed concern for stipulating a duty of reasonable 
dispatch without agreement because the further costs that will be charged by 
the carriers for this increased duty will be affecting the whole transport 
industry, even the cargo owners of low value goods. If the carrier has a 
statutorial duty to carry goods with a reasonable dispatch, he will charge his 
customers for the increased duty. This will not only be for the customers 
that are in need of a timely delivery, it will be for all kinds of customers. 
The duty is at hand at all times, no matter if the customer is intending to use 
his right to compensation due to delay or not. This will lead to higher freight 
rates in the whole industry. The opposite point of view would be that the 
practical implications of a statutorial obligation would not be as alleged by 
the American delegation. Even if the duty of a timely performance is 
imposed on the carrier, it will be aware of the fact that amounts that can be 
lost by cargo owners of low value goods will be limited. In other words, as 
the possible amount that a cargo owner of low value goods could claim will 
not be significant, the freight rate for this type of cargo will not increase 
significantly. As the claimant has the onus of proving the amount lost due to 
the delay, any practical effects will not arise from a delay since it would be 
unlikely for the carrier to have to pay any large amounts for an occurred 
delay when carrying low value goods.  
 
No matter how a statutorial delay will affect the freight rates, I can agree 
that an imposed duty of timely performance by statute will give rise to 
 45
uncertainty to some extent. Since the need for protection is not equal in the 
whole industry, I find that a statutorial delay without any sort of prior 
agreement is not the right way to draft a delay provision. 
 
It is not as controversial to have a delay provision for short distances as it is 
for long ocean transports. This is why the provisions in the Nordic Maritime 
Codes are practically feasible and not very controversial, whereas issues 
arise in the process of drafting a convention on a global level. The number 
of perils and obstacles in the Baltic Sea are less than those for long voyages 
around the globe. This said, I find that an imposed duty without any prior 
common understanding between the parties is too cargo owner friendly to 
have a well balanced convention. In order to keep the cargo owner 
protection and still draft a well balanced convention, it has been suggested 
to shift the burden of proof to the cargo claimant. The UNCTAD/ICC 
solution of having a declaration of interest as condition to enforce the delay 
provision is another solution.     
6.2.3.1 Shifting the burden of proof 
Nicholas Gaskell has suggested that the issues on delay could be resolved 
by putting the burden of proof on the cargo claimant.111 Gaskell sees big 
problems in having a statutorial delay because it will have serious effects on 
the practical application of the rule. He believes that a carrier of a delayed 
container ship will not bother to contest delay claims for the amount of 
containers he is carrying, because the task of doing so means too much 
administration. A carrier carrying thousands of containers will have to deal 
with thousands of claims from all the cargo owners. Instead, Gaskell thinks 
that the carrier will refund the freight rates automatically to avoid such 
administration. As one of the solutions to this problem, he suggests that if 
the burden of proving the delay is shifted to the cargo claimant, this 
practical problem could be avoided by decreasing the amount of claims. 
 
I disagree with the suggestion provided by Gaskell. Jurisprudence has well 
established the burden of proof on the carrier for a reason. It is difficult 
enough to present any form of evidence for a delaying event, for the 
claimant this would go further, an impossible task. The information that can 
be presented to support an alleged defence for an occurred delay can only be 
presented by the carrier itself. The carrier is the only party to the contract of 
carriage that was present during the delaying event, thus the cargo claimant 
could not have any chance for a successful claim if the burden of proving 
the delay was on him. The claimant would only be able to guess what 
caused the delay, the only fact available to the claimant is that his cargo 
arrived late. 
 
I fully agree with the issues that Gaskell presents as worrying with imposing 
a statuorial duty of timely delivery. However, it is not best resolved by 
putting the burden of proving the delay on the claimant. I think the issue is 
                                                 
111 Gaskell, N “Damages, Delay and Limitation of Liability under the Hamburg Rules 
1978”. In: Kegels, T (ed.) The Hamburg Rules: A Choice for the EEC? (Antwerp, MAKLU 
Uitgevers, 1994, 1st ed)  at 153. 
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better resolved by putting an obligation of declaration of interest on the 
consignor.  
6.2.3.2 Declaration of interest 
In order to have a successfully drafted instrument, one has to consider the 
pragmatic effects of the provisions that are under judgement. The best way 
ought to be to consider rules that actually are used in practise. The 
UNCTAD/ICC rules are shown to work in practise, which should lessen the 
controversy in incorporating the same rules in an internationally binding 
instrument. The declaration of interest has its advantages. At the same time 
a statutorial obligation of timely delivery is stipulated to protect the cargo 
owner, the carrier is becoming aware and is able to predict the possible 
effects of a possible delay on his side. Thus, imposing a duty to declare 
interest in a timely delivery is a compromise between the interests involved. 
The cargo owner is protected by the statutorial duty of a timely delivery and 
the carrier is given the necessary predictability. The declaration of interest 
resolves the problems of interpreting the “reasonable carrier” requirement 
and gives both contracting parties’ specific times which they both can relate 
to. This should decrease the number of claims and make it easier for 
contracting parties to settle claims without any significant legal costs. 
 
The declaration of interest is not the same as negotiating terms of a contract, 
even though the two processes have their similarities. It is above stated that 
the cargo owner rarely is able to negotiate the terms of the contract, but by 
this solution, he is given the opportunity to be protected by law and have his 
goods delivered in time as required by stipulating it on the bill of lading. 
The same effect as for negotiating the terms of the contract can be reached 
without a difficult negotiating process. The cargo owner who wishes to 
stipulate such term in the contract of carriage will most likely have to pay an 
increased freight rate, but the importance of a timely delivery should be 
reason enough for this extra expense. Also, the increased freight rate will 
only be borne by the cargo owners who are really in need of the timely 
delivery and not by all cargo owners. This, in combination with the 
predictability for the carriers is supporting the view that the statutorial duty 
of timely delivery with the additional duty to declare interest in order to 
enforce the rule is the best compromise solution for a delay provision. It is 
confusing to me why UNCITRAL has not even considered such a solution 
in the draft.  
 
One problem with the UNCTAD/ICC solution is that the carrier needs to 
agree on this duty. This means that the carrier can refuse to perform the 
carriage with a duty of dispatch. However, with time, such behaviour of the 
carrier could be of its disadvantage with regards to good will and reputation 
in the transport industry. For the same reason MTOs have taken the 
voluntary responsibility in multimodal carriage today, the MTO would 
likely not want to have reputation of refusing customers the services they 
want the carrier to perform.    
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6.3 Closing comments 
By deleting the imposed liability for what could be expected by a 
“reasonable carrier” in the UNCITRAL draft the parties have come one step 
further towards a feasible convention. I find that it is a well considered 
compromise from all parties and it shows that the parties are intending the 
convention to have effect and not merely be a toothless set of rules. What 
many would call a hopeless project when CMI initiated the work and 
handed it over to UNCITRAL is not that hopeless any longer. The European 
draft of a multimodal set of rules will most likely put pressure on the 
international work process to make further compromises in order to fulfil 
the task of drafting a feasible instrument for the purpose of multimodal 
transport.  
 
However, the flip side of the coin of a feasible instrument is that the 
outcome of the compromise made is perhaps not the fairest. It is important 
to retain the right balances between the carrier and the cargo owner. The 
delay provision as drafted today is not that well balanced, since it tends to 
be a bit more carrier friendly. A better balanced delay regime would be to 
have a statutorial duty on the carrier with a duty of declaring interest in a 
timely delivery on the cargo owner. It has shown to work in practise and 
protects the cargo owners while imposing no unreasonable and 
unpredictable duty on the carrier. By having this procedure, the carrier 
becomes aware of the theoretical amount that he can be liable for towards 
the claimant and he is aware of his duty of dispatch.  
 
In any event, the current delay provision will not be one of the provisions 
preventing states from signing the UNCITRAL convention. It is a political 
compromise and is in line with the feasibility desired, fair or not.  
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